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"It will be easier to get cocaine into Europe than a contraband
banana. "1
If the people of Dominica cannot make a living exporting bananas,
they will export cocaine.2
The European Community's tariff regime on bananas is nothing
more than a "programme to promote the production of cocaine."3
INTRODUCTION
Latin Americans are losing jobs, and some fear that the unem-
ployed will resort to growing and exporting cocaine to Europe and the
United States. Europeans in the transport industry, particularly
Germans, are losing jobs because of the European banana tariff.
American multinational corporations worry about losing millions of
dollars in Latin American and European investments, while European
multinational corporations are eager to capture the market share that
the Americans are unable to serve.4 Meanwhile, African, Caribbean
and Pacific ("ACP") nations rejoice over their guaranteed exports to
Europe. The reason for the disturbance is the European Commu-
nity's quota for bananas.
The European Community is, among other things, a large customs
union designed to regulate the external trade of a common market
consisting of the entire Western European region, with the exception
1. Belgium: Steichen Says EC Farm Market Access Offer Final, Reuter Newswire,
Dec. 15, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS File (quoting Enrique
Betancourt, director of the Panama-based Union of Banana Exporting Countries).
2. John Rothchild, The Banana Wars, Time, Oct. 17, 1994, at 39 (referring to
warning from Dame Eugenia Charles, Prime Minister of the island of Dominica).
3. EC: Wave of Reactions to EC Decisions on Bananas, Agence Europe, Reuter
Textline, Feb. 18, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS File (quoting
Edward Linter, German Secretary of State at the Interior Ministry).
4. European firms that trade in bananas have seen their shares rise since the
implementation of the banana regime. Banana Shares Ripen, The Guardian, Jan. 13,
1995, at 17.
1284 [Vol. 63
GOING BANANAS
of Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. In 1993, the Com-
munity, through its Council of Ministers, created a banana tariff re-
gime, allowing traditional ACP-grown bananas to enter into the
market freely. The Community also set a quota on Latin-grown ba-
nanas, reducing the Latin American share in the EC market. This
regulation5 disturbs the global banana trade, causing firms and indi-
viduals working with Latin bananas to lose money and firms and indi-
viduals working with ACP bananas to earn more.
This banana tariff regime does not pass muster under international
trade rules. The regime strikes at the heart of the international trade
regulation system known as the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 6 ("GATT"). The GATT, an international trade regulatory
body, enforces many multilateral trade agreements, one of which is
also termed the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("General
Agreement"). The General Agreement is the legal basis used by the
involved trade parties to fight for their interests. The EC banana re-
gine, by differentiating between ACP and Latin bananas, is inconsis-
tent with certain articles of the General Agreement. Nevertheless,
while the United States fears the prospect that its multinational corpo-
rations will suffer large losses because of the regime, the European
Community does not want to terminate its banana regime. Addition-
ally, the ACP nations want to protect the regime because it is in their
benefit. The United States is currently identifying European targets
for possible trade retaliation.7
Despite the existence of the GAIT, the banana trade dispute re-
mains unresolved because the GATT system contains many weak-
nesses, rendering it ineffective as a trade regulating organization. In
fact, many contracting parties of the GAT are dissatisfied with the
GATT and its inability to resolve certain trade debates. In response,
the GATT contracting parties recently completed negotiations on a
large series of agreements known as the Uruguay Round.8 The con-
tracting parties intend that these accords, in particular the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, remedy the perceived
faults of the older GAT system.9
This Note examines how the banana dispute, a politically controver-
sial trade dispute, can be resolved through legal means. Part I ex-
5. Council Regulation 404/93 of 13 February 1993 on the Common Organization
of the Market in Bananas, 1993 OJ. (L 47) 1.
6. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947,
61 Stat. A5, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1948).
7. See Debra Percival, Trade-Bananas: Threat of Trans-Atlantic Trade War over
Bananas, Inter Press Service, Jan. 10, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library,
ALLNWS File.
8. See Uruguay Round Implementing Legislation, COM(94)414 final.
9. The WTO is a new international organization created to monitor and enforce
world trade trade agreements such as the General Agreement. For a more in-depth
discussion of the WTO, see infra notes 250-304 and accompanying text.
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plains the basic structure of the GATr. Part II highlights the
institutional structure of the WTO as well as its intended functions in
global trade. Part III scrutinizes the background to the banana trade
dispute and the current situation and examines the case law of the
Court of the European Communities regarding the General Agree-
ment. Part IV applies the GATT dispute resolution procedure to the
banana trade debate to demonstrate the GATT's inadequacies. Fi-
nally, Part V explores the WTO resolution process to demonstrate
how the GATT and the WTO operate differently. This Note con-
cludes that any controversial trade debate, such as the banana dispute,
can be resolved only by a single forum, the WTO, with its strict rules
on dispute resolution and its ability to enforce panel decisions.
I. WHAT is GATT?
The term "GATr" usually refers to one of two things. First, the
General Agreement is referred to as the GATT. Second, the organi-
zational staff located in Geneva is called the GATr.10
A. The General Agreement
The General Agreement was adopted in 1948 by major trading
countries seeking an immediate reduction of tariffs." The General
Agreement was not intended to give rise to an international organiza-
tion. 2 Rather, the Agreement was meant to function as a temporary
trade agreement. The participating countries were not interested in
creating a document to be strictly construed. 3 As a result, the text of
the Agreement contains a provisional character that remains today.' 4
In contrast to the General Agreement, the participating countries
planned to create an International Trade Organization to function
permanently. The ITO's intended function was to enforce a strict set
of trade regulations. The ITO was to serve as one of the three pillars
of post-Second World War international economic development,
alongside the International Monetary Fund and the International
10. For some, the term GATT is used to refer to more than 180 treaties that deal
both directly and indirectly with the General Agreement. John H. Jackson, Restruc-
turing the GATT System 26 (1990). In addition, GATT serves as a forum for the
continuing discussion of multilateral trade agreements on the reduction of tariffs and
trade policy. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Application of GATT by the Court of Jus-
tice of the European Communities, 20 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 397,419 (1983) [herein-
after Application of GATT. The text of the General Agreement will be referred to as
the "General Agreement." The organization in Geneva will be referred to as
"GAT."
11. Robert E. Hudec, The GATr Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy 57
(2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter Legal System].
12. Id.
13. See id. at 58.
14. See Olivier Long, Law and its Limitations in the GATE Multilateral Trade
System 11 (1987).
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Bank for Reconstruction and Development ("World Bank"). As one
of the three pillars, the ITO was to nurture world trade and thereby
revitalize the global economy.'5 The major trading powers intended
that the ITO absorb the provisional General Agreement when the
ITO came into force. 6 But the ITO was never adopted by the United
States Senate because the Senate did not approve of the ITO, 7 pre-
sumably because of its strict rules. In fact, the ITO was not adopted
by most of the nations, and, as a result, the General Agreement be-
came a permanent international accord.
The General Agreement, as a provisional document, is applied by
the contracting parties on the basis of the "Protocol of Provisional
Application of the General Agreement" of October 30, 194718 and
subsequent Protocols of Accession to the General Agreement.' 9 The
Protocol of Provisional Application contains two major clauses: (1)
15. See id. at 1. As one commentator noted:
[Tihe ITO was not designed simply to enforce a set of trade rules, but was to
be an organization for dealing with a range of post-war international eco-
nomic problems, including the moderation of fluctuations in international
commodity prices, promoting balance of payments equilibrium (in coopera-
tion with the IMF), eliminating restrictive business practices, and promoting
employment.
Raymond F. Mikeseli, Antecedents of the ITO Charter and Their Relevance for the
Uruguay Round, 14 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 323,328 (1994). Therefore, the ITO would have
imposed a stricter code of behavior than the provisional document, the General
Agreement. In retrospect, the idea of an international organization that has the
power to adjudicate disputes and take cohesive actions may not seem so incredible.
The concept of sovereign states granting an international body the power to limit their
power to retaliate in international trade affairs was a new principle at the time. Legal
System, supra note 11, at 40.
16. Id. at 50.
17. Long, supra note 14, at 1; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The EEC as a GATT
Member, in The European Community and GATT 23,24 (Meinhard Hilf, et al. eds.,
1986) [hereinafter The EEC as a GA7T Member].
The ITO contained provisions creating quasi-judicial bodies formed to adjudicate
claims, and the ITO's decisions could have led to the creation of a comprehensive
body of ITO common law. Legal System, supra note 11, at 37. This "common law"
aspect reappears in the WTO, because article XVI(1) of the WTO Agreement states
that the WTO "shall be guided by the decisions" of GATT 1947. Agreement Estab-
lishing the World Trade Organization, reprinted in Proposal for a Council Decision
Concerning the Conclusion of the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations (1986-94), COM(94)143 final 9, art. XVI(1). While in a practical
sense article XVI(1) is providing for continuity in the adjudication of claims, it none-
theless carries over from the GATT a body of case law that could have precedential
effect. Stare decisis does not exist in international law, but the GATr panels do rely
somewhat heavily on prior panel decisions. Miquel Montafla i Mora, A GA7T With
Teeth. Law Wins Over Politics in the Resolution of International Trade Disputes, 31
Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 103, 162 (1993).
18. Of all the contracting parties, only Haiti and Liberia have ratified the General
Agreement. The EEC as a GA7T Member, supra note 17, at 26. The Agreement
applies to subsequent contracting parties by their individual accession agreements
rather than the Protocol. Long, supra note 14, at 11-12.
19. The EEC as a GATT Member, supra note 17, at 26; Long, supra note 14, at 11-
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that the contracting party governments assume the legal obligations of
the General Agreement "provisionally"; and (2) that the governments
agree to bind themselves only "to the fullest extent not inconsistent
with existing legislation.""0 The General Agreement does not have
retroactive effect, but violations of the General Agreement by con-
tracting parties can be made through subsequent legislation. 1
B. GATT, the Organization
The GATT, the organization, oversees all GATT activities. In addi-
tion to supervising the enforcement of the General Agreement, the
organization serves as a forum for the creation of additional trade
agreements.22 Some of these agreements, such as the Multifibre
Agreement, bind countries that are not contracting parties to the
GAI-T. 23
Despite the deliberate attempt to avoid making the GATT a formal
international organization at the GATT's inception,24 a regulatory sys-
tem developed to implement the General Agreement and to ensure its
effectiveness.' At the highest level of the GATT are the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES who are responsible for performing all official
decision making functions.2 6 Because at least 123 GATT contracting
20. Legal System, supra note 11, at 51 (citation omitted).
21. The General Agreement is an international accord that is binding upon the
contracting parties based on the idea of pacta sunt servanda, as codified in article 26 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, which is a general principle of law
common to all legal systems represented in the GATT. Montafla i Mora, supra note
13, at 112. Pacta sunt servanda means that parties to every treaty in force must per-
form their obligations in good faith. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May
23, 1969, art. 26, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
22. Some have thus used the term the GATT to refer to a series of separate multi-
lateral trade negotiations. See Long, supra note 14, at 16.
23. For example, the People's Republic of China became a party to the MFA on
January 18, 1984. Long, supra note 14, at 41.
24. Legal System, supra note 11, at 51.
25. This is especially so because the iTO failed to come into existence. Had the
ITO been created, it would have been charged with administering and implementing
all the multilateral trade accords. For a discussion of the ITO, see supra notes 15-17
and accompanying text.
26. Legal System, supra note 8, at 51.
Following standard convention, throughout this Note, wherever reference is made
to the contracting parties acting jointly in their official capacity, they are designated as
the CONTRACTING PARTIES. GATT, supra note 6, art. XXV.
As of July 31, 1994, the 123 contracting parties to the GATT and the year in which
they signed are: Angola (1994), Antigua and Barbuda (1987), Argentina (1967), Aus-
tralia (1948), Austria (1951), Bahrain (1994), Bangladesh (1972), Barbados (1967),
Belgium (1948), Belize (1983), Benin (1990), Bolivia (1990), Botswana (1987), Brazil(1948), Brunei (1993), Burkina Faso (1963), Burundi (1965), Cameroon (1963), Can-
ada (1948), Central African Republic (1963), Chad (1963), Chile (1949), Colombia(1981), Congo (1963), Costa Rica (1990), C6te d'Ivoire (1963), Cuba (1948), Cyprus(1963), Czech Republic (1993), Denmark (1950), Dominica (1993), Dominican Re-
public (1950), Egypt (1970), El Salvador (1991), Fiji (1993), Finland (1950), France(1948), Gabon (1963), Gambia (1965), Germany (1951), Ghana (1957), Greece
1288 [Vol. 63
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parties exist, and decisions must be made frequently, another entity
known as the Council27 facilitates the process. The Council is the
CONTRACTING PARTIES' inter-sessional body, which is author-
ized to address any issues normally dealt with by the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES during their sessions and any urgent matters
when it is logistically easier to call a meeting of the Council than the
CONTRACTING PARTIES. 2 The Council is comprised of all of the
representatives of the contracting parties that have requested such
representation. 29 Two of the Council's most important tasks are the
appointment of panel members in the dispute resolution process and
the determination of the panels' terms of reference.30 While the
Council also adopts panel reports, such panel reports have legal effect
only if they are referenced in the Council's annual report, and the
CONTRACTING PARTIES in turn adopt the annual report.3'
II. WHAT IS THE WTO?
Currently, a new international trade regulating body, the WTO,
stands to absorb the GATT. If the WTO Agreement is adopted by all
the GATT contracting parties,32 the current GATT structure will
(1950), Grenada (1994), Guatemala (1991), Guinea-Bissau (1994), Guyana (1966),
Haiti (1950), Honduras (1994), Hong Kong (1986), Hungary (1973), Iceland (1968),
India (1948), Indonesia (1950), Ireland (1967), Israel (1962), Italy (1950), Jamaica
(1963), Japan (1955), Kenya (1964), Korea (1964), Kuwait (1963), Lesotho (1988),
Liechtenstein (1994), Luxembourg (1948), Macau (1991), Madagascar (1963), Malawi
(1964), Malaysia (1957), Maldives (1983), Mali (1993), Malta (1964), Mauritania
(1963), Mauritius (1970), Mexico (1986), Morocco (1987), Mozambique (1992), My-
anmar (1948), Namibia (1992), Netherlands (1948), New Zealand (1948), Nicaragua
(1950), Niger (1963), Nigeria (1960), Norway (1948), Pakistan (1948), Paraguay
(1993), Peru (1948), Philippines (1979), Poland (1967), Portugal (1962), Qatar (1994),
Romania (1971), Rwanda (1966), Saint Kitts & Nevis (1994), Saint Lucia (1993), Saint
Vincent (1993), Senegal (1963), Sierra Leone (1961), Singapore (1973), Slovakia
(1993), South Africa (1948), Spain (1963), Sri Lanka (1948), Suriname (1978), Swazi-
land (1993), Sweden (1950), Switzerland (1966), Tanzania (1961), Thailand (1982),
Togo (1964), Trinidad & Tobago (1962), Thnisia (1990), Trkey (1951), Uganda
(1962), United Arab Emirates (1994), United Kingdom (1948), United States (1948),
Uruguay (1953), Venezuela (1990), Yugoslavia (1966), Zaire (1971), Zambia (1982),
Zimbabwe (1948). Two non-contracting parties who participated in the Uruguay
Round are China and Algeria. Facsimile from the United States Trade Representative
2 (July 31, 1994) (on fie with the Fordham Law Review).
27. The Council, not provided for in the General Agreement, was established by a
decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES on June 4, 1960. Long, supra note 14, at
47.
28. See id&
29. Id.
30. See id.
31. Id.
32. In the case of the European Community, both the Community and its member
states were required to ratify the Uruguay Round accords because the Community
and its member states shared competence. See Opinion 1/94 of the Court of Justice
(Competence of the Community to conclude international agreements concerning
services and the protection of intellectual property - Article 228(6) of the EC
Treaty) at 1 106 (Nov. 15, 1994) (LEXIS, Eurcom library, CASES file).
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cease to exist. A more in-depth examination of the WTO is crucial to
understanding the banana trade dispute because the WTO provides
the only forum for various nations to resolve the banana trade
dispute.
A. The Organization
Essentially a newer version of the ITO,33 the WTO clearly defines
the obligations and duties of its members as laid out in multilateral
trade agreements such as the General Agreement and the Multifibre
Agreement.34 The WTO consists of contracting parties to the General
Agreement that ratified the Uruguay Round and will eventually in-
clude non-contracting parties who have applied for WTO member-
ship, including Russia, China and Taiwan. Contracting parties who
fail to approve the Uruguay Round remain part of "GATT 1947," a
term coined by the WTO Agreement,35 as opposed to approving par-
ties who become "GAIT 1994" members. 6
33. The WTO is a newer version of the ITO, and significant similarities exist be-
tween the two. The WTO Agreement specifically states its intention to cooperate,
when appropriate, with the IMF and the World Bank. WTO Agreement, supra note
17, art. III(5). Thus, the WTO acts as the third pillar in the global economy by facili-
tating trade growth and assisting developing countries to compete in the global econ-
omy. The second similarity between the two bodies is the legalistic structure
contained in their respective charters.
The WTO, like the ITO, contains provisions providing for developing countries in
its day-to-day operations. First, article XI(2) of the WTO Agreement provides that
U.N. designated "least-developed countries" can make adjustments in their commit-
ments and concessions consistent with their "individual development, financial and
trade needs or their administrative and institutional capabilities."'WTO Agreement,
supra note 17, art. XI(2). Another area where the new trade system makes conces-
sions for developing countries is in article 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Proce-
dures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, where WTO members are advised to
pay "special attention to the particular problems and interests of developing country
Members." Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, reprinted in Proposal for a Council Decision Concerning the Conclusion of
the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1986-94),
COM(94)143 final 353, art. 4(10).
If a dispute between a developing country member and a developed country mem-
ber arises, the dispute panel shall, upon the request of the developing country, "in-
clude at least one panelist from a developing country Member." DSU, supra, art.
8(10). Also, in such a dispute, the panel's report must state explicitly how the status
of the developing country member has been considered in the panel's report. Article
12(11) provides:
Where one or more of the parties is a developing country Member, the
panel's report shall explicitly indicate the form in which account has been
taken of relevant provisions on differential and more-favourable treatment
for developing country Members that form part of the covered agreements
which have been raised by the developing country Member in the course of
the dispute settlement procedures.
DSU, supra, art. 12(11). Article 24 of the Understanding is devoted to special proce-
dures involving least-developed country members.
34. See DSU, supra note 33, app. 1.
35. WTO Agreement, supra note 17, art. 11(4).
36. Id.
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The WTO contains a complex institutional structure carefully delin-
eated in the WTO Agreement. At the top of the hierarchy is the Min-
isterial Conference, which is made up of the representatives of all
WTO members. The Conference meets at least once every two years
and carries out the executive decisions of the WTO.3 The Ministerial
Conference is the WTO equivalent of the GAT]" CONTRACTING
PARTIES, so the Conference is made up of senior level officials. Be-
neath the Ministerial Conference is the General Council, the
equivalent of the GATT Council. The General Council is made up of
representatives of all WTO members, but of lower level representa-
tives who meet more frequently to carry out tasks to ensure the
WTO's effectiveness. 8 One of the General Council's most important
jobs is to define the competence of the Dispute Settlement Body.39
The General Council also determines the competence of the Trade
Policy Review Body." At a still lower level of the institutional struc-
ture are various councils: the Council for Trade in Goods, the Council
for Trade in Services and the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights.41 The WTO institution further includes
various committees: the Committee on Trade and Development, the
Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions and the Committee
on Budget, Finance and Administration.42
B. The WTO Agreement
Aside from its institutional aspect, the WTO Agreement references
an "Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settle-
ment of Disputes" ("DSU"),43 which details the requirements and
time allowances of each step of WTO dispute resolution. The exten-
sive dispute resolution procedures specifically call for legal and expert
analysis through the appointment of legal and trade experts in panels.
Moreover, a body of case law continues to grow through previous
panel decisions."4
Another major feature of the WTO is the diminished role of con-
sensus voting under the WTO. On the one hand, the WTO Agree-
ment specifically provides for the continuation of consensus voting
37. Id. art. IV(1).
38. Id. art. IV(2).
39. Id. art. IV(3).
40. Id. art. 1V(4).
41. For the purposes of this discussion, it is sufficient to state that these Councils
will facilitate further discussion of trade regulation in their respective fields, as well as
assist the WTO in the enforcement of all the trade agreements. Id art. IV(5).
42. Id- art. IV(7).
43. See infra notes 256-89 and accompanying text.
44. This is especially true because it appears that panel decisions adopted by the
CONTRACTING PARTIES can be referenced by the WTO panels. See DSU, supra
note 33, art. 3(1).
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under the General Agreement.4 5 On the other hand, the Agreement
states that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided, where a decision cannot
be arrived at by consensus, the matter at issue shall be decided by
voting. '' 46 Thus, it seems that majority voting is the default rule, de-
spite the continuing practice of decision making by consensus. The
introduction of majority voting into the WTO significantly impacts
political negotiation among WTO members. The allocation of votes is
not weighted to allow for the varying economic powers of members.47
Each country receives one vote, and, as a result, the WTO's voting
structure may shift the political balance.' The relationship between
these two provisions remains unclear, and it is possible that the rela-
tionship between the two provisions will only be clarified after a pe-
riod of activity under the WTO.
C. The "Residual Clause" of the DSU
The DSU contains a "residual clause," which states that all disputes
arising under the GATT before the enactment of the WTO must be
settled according to the dispute resolution procedure of article XXIII
of the General Agreement rather than the WTO.a9
The Understanding provides that the WTO procedures apply to
new requests by a member for disputes under agreements made on or
after the effective date of the WTO Agreement.5 0 Dispute resolution
procedures under articles XXII and XXIII of the General Agreement
or a procedure separately agreed upon apply to requests made under
"GATT 1947" or any agreement entered into before the effective date
of the WTO Agreement.5 1 As the WTO Agreement notes:
With respect to disputes for which the request for consultations was
made under GATT 1947 or under any other predecessor agreement
to the covered agreements before the date of entry into force of the
WTO Agreement, the relevant dispute settlement rules and proce-
dures in effect immediately prior to the date of entry into force of
the WTO Agreement shall continue to apply.52
The "residual clause" of the DSU seems straightforward on its face. If
a GATT contracting party requests dispute resolution, either article
XXII or XXIII of the General Agreement or a separately agreed
upon dispute resolution procedure applies. If a WTO member re-
45. WTO Agreement, supra note 17, art. IX(1).
46. Id.
47. The provisions of the WTO Agreement regarding voting further provide the
European Community with the number of votes equal to the number of its member
states who also are members of the WTO. Id.
48. Traditional GATT practice avoids formal voting except for waivers, member-
ship and treaty amendments. Jackson, supra note 10, at 22.
49. DSU, supra note 33, art. 3(11).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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quests dispute resolution, the WTO dispute resolution procedures ap-
ply. A contracting party involved in a dispute that has already
commenced in the GATT cannot, upon its ratification of the WTO,
remove that dispute to the WTO. Some questions remain. For exam-
ple, if a country sought dispute resolution under "GAIT 1947," and a
panel report is issued but not adopted, could that country request
WTO dispute resolution based on the same trade dispute? Secondly,
must the dispute arise under "GAIT 1994" for the WTO dispute reso-
lution procedures to apply?
If the answer to the first inquiry is yes, the banana trade dispute
cannot be resolved under WTO procedures because the dispute is al-
ready the subject of two GATT panel reports. But article XXIII of
the General Agreement suggests that WTO dispute resolution is ap-
propriate. Article XXIII provides for dispute resolution "not only in
[the] case of [a] violation of GATT obligations but also in [the] case of
[a] nullification or impairment of economic benefits which could bona
fide be 'reasonably expected' under GATT law."53 The language of
article XXIII loosely describes the circumstances under which dispute
resolution can be requested and fails to limit a contracting party's abil-
ity to re-raise a trade issue in a subsequent dispute resolution proceed-
ing. Thus, WTO members can request dispute resolution of trade
issues already reviewed under "GATT 1947."
To qualify for WTO dispute resolution, it is further necessary that
the dispute arise under "GATT 1994." Article 26 of the WTO Agree-
ment deals specifically with non-violation complaints of the type de-
scribed in article XXIII. 4 Thus, a Latin American country or the
United States would need a separate cause of action under "GAIT
1994" to claim that the banana dispute arises under the WTO.55 Arti-
cle 26(2) of the DSU states that for dispute resolutions regarding arti-
cle XXII156 complaints, traditional GATT practice applies. Thus, the
article XXIII cause of action cannot be used to interpret the residual
clause of the Understanding.57
In practice, the readings that provide that WTO procedures apply
to new requests as opposed to new disputes will probably prevail.
Thus, although the banana trade dispute has already been treated by
the GATT panel reports, it is likely that a WTO member will still be
able to seek WTO dispute resolution. In conclusion, the WTO Agree-
ment can be interpreted as an attempt by the international community
to legalize trade disputes and decrease the political aspect of these
disputes. By functioning as a dispute resolution forum, the WTO will
53. Application of GATT, supra note 10, at 433.
54. GATF, supra note 6, art. XXIII(1)(b).
55. See DSU, supra note 33, art. 26.
56. GATT, supra note 6, art. XXIII(1)(b).
57. The "residual clause" is article 3(11) of the DSU, supra note 33.
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function as an international tribunal with the power to enforce its
judgments.5 8
III. APPLYING FACTS TO THEORY: THE BANANA TRADE DISPUTE
The banana dispute is a complicated issue that involves world his-
tory, politics between developing and developed nations, and the case
law of the European Court of Justice. It is necessary to examine each
facet of the banana dispute independently and then consider how they
interact with each other under the GATT system.
A. Background
The banana dispute has been an issue in international trade for
many decades. The history of the dispute reveals that bananas have
played an important role in the European Community since its crea-
tion. An examination of the development of the banana trade within
the European Community further demonstrates that several impor-
tant legal issues give rise to the difficulties involved in the dispute's
resolution.
1. History
To better understand the controversy surrounding the banana trade,
an examination of the European Community and the development of
the banana trade is necessary. Attached to the Treaty Establishing the
European Economic Community 9 is a Banana Protocol. The Proto-
col was the result of the Federal Republic of Germany's refusal to sign
the EEC Treaty until Germany was given the right to import an ad-
justable amount of Latin bananas duty free.' While some perceived
bananas as just a fruit, Germans viewed them as an important cultural
icon.61 The Protocol in the EEC Treaty established a German free
import ceiling to be adjusted by amendment to provide for the banana
demand in the German market. Bananas, from the founding of the
Community, could not be circulated freely in the Community because
the Protocol applied only to Germany.62
A tariff regime was introduced to provide preferential treatment to
bananas from the ACP nations in 1993.3 After the United Kingdom
58. See infra notes 250-304 and accompanying text.
59. Known as the European Community since 1993.
60. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community [EEC Treaty] Proto-
col on Bananas (as in effect in 1958).
61. Sarah Lambert, Germany: Commodities-Germans Fail to Repeal EC Banana
Tariffs, Independent, July 5, 1994, at 23.
62. EEC Treaty, Protocol on Bananas [as in effect in 1958].
63. Council Regulation 404/93 of 13 February 1993 on the Common Organization
of the Market in Bananas, art. 18, 1993 OJ. (L 47) 1, 7 (providing that while tradi-
tional ACP banana producers may be imported into the Community tariff free, a tariff
quota for non-traditional ACP bananas and third-country (e.g., Latin American) ba-
nanas is mandated). The quota on non-traditional ACP bananas can be seen as con-
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joined the Community, the Commonwealth countries along with for-
mer French colonies joined to form the African, Caribbean and Pa-
cific group. The ACP nations negotiated with the Community for a
preferential trade agreement now known as Lom6 I.
flicting with article 168(1) of the Lom6 IV Convention, which provides that
"[p]roducts originating in the ACP States shall be imported into the Community free
of customs duties and charges having equivalent effect." Fourth ACP-EEC Conven-
tion, 1989, art. 168(1), reprinted in The Courier, Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 46. Thus, facially
it appears that the Community is violating article 168(1) by imposing a banana tariff,
covering even bananas of ACP origin. Article 168(1), however, is limited by article
168(2) of the Fourth ACP-EEC Convention and article 1 of Protocol 5 on Bananas.
See Fourth ACP-EEC Convention, 1989, art. 168(2), reprinted in The Courier, Mar.-
Apr. 1990, at 46; Protocol 5 on Bananas, art. 1, reprinted in The Courier, Mar.-Apr.
1990, at 150. Thus, whether the Council Regulation on the banana tariff violates the
Lor6 IV Convention depends on how one interprets these different articles.
64. Douglas E. Matthews, Lom6 IV and ACP/EEC Relations: Surviving the Lost
Decade, 22 Cal. W. Int'l LJ. 1, 26 (1991). The European Commission stated:
The Lor6 Convention, which links 70 countries in Africa, the Caribbean
and the Pacific to the 12 European Union Member States, remains the larg-
est collective cooperation agreement in the history of relations between the
countries of the North and those of the South: its foundation was laid in the
Treaty of Rome itself (March 25, 1957) whose signatories confirmed the soli-
darity which links Europe and overseas countries. Then after the 1960's in-
dependances, there followed the two Yaound6 Conventions of 1963 and 1969
between the EC and 18 African States.
In 1975, the European Community signed the first Lom6 Convention
(Lomb, the capital of Togo, was where the signing ceremony took place)
with a group of 46 independent States. 57 States signed the Lomre II Con-
vention (1980-1985), 65 the Lom mI Convention (1985-1990) and 69 ACP
countries the fourth Lor6 Convention (1990-2000) in 1989. This number
was taken to 70 in 1993 with the accession of Eritrea to independence. The
Lom6 Convention very soon became a model of cooperation for develop-
ment and the amount of aid provided has continued to grow.
This financial aid is implemented via the European Development Fund
(EDF) which receives direct, five-yearly contributions from EU Member
States. ACP countries are also eligible for European Investment Bank
(EIB) own resources.
As far as trade is concerned, the ACP countries benefit from a very gener-
ous regime, since almost all their exports have free access to the European
market without the condition of a reciprocal arrangement.
With regard to the origin of products exported by ACP countries to the
European Union, the Lom6 Convention authorizes exemptions from the ba-
sic "10% foreign components rule": products imported from an ACP coun-
try, of which components up to 45% come from the EU or another ACP
country are considered to be ACP products, and benefit from privileged ac-
cess to the Single European Market...
The fourth Lom6 Convention also urged respect for human rights, includ-
ing social, economic and cultural rights, the achievement of which is a funda-
mental development objective. The 70 ACP partners have accepted
explicitly that the EDF shall finance activities initiated by ACP countries,
that aim to promote these rights in the interests of constructing multi-party,
civilian-oriented societies.
The fourth Lom6 Convention also resolved to promote decentralized co-
operation, calling on local public and private sector partners - companies
and associations operating in the communities, Non Governmental Organi-
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sation (NGOs) and trade unions, etc. - to bring about the "participatory de-
velopment" of local populations.
Environmental protection in ACP countries is another integral part of the
Convention. Long-term development aid has taken on a new dimension in
making ecological concerns an area of cooperation in their own right.
European Commission, EU-ACP Cooperation 7-8 (1994).
Currently, 70 ACP states are parties to the Lom6 Convention: Angola*, Antigua
and Barbuda*, Bahamas, Barbados*, Belize*, Benin*, Botswana*, Burkina Faso*,
Burundi*, Cameroon*, Cape Verde, Central African Republic*, Chad*, Comoros,
Congo*, C6te d'Ivoire*, Djibouti, Dominica*, Dominican Republic*, Eritrea, Ethio-
pia, Fiji*, Gabon*, Gambia*, Ghana*, Grenada*, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau*, Equatorial
Guinea, Guyana*, Haiti*, Jamaica*, Kenya*, Kiribati, Lesotho*, Liberia, Madagas-
car*, Malawi*, Mali*, Mauritania*, Mauritius*, Mozambique*, Namibia*, Niger*, Ni-
geria*, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda*, Saint Kitts and Negvis*, Saint Lucia*, Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines*, Western Samoa, Sao Tom6 and Principe, Senegal*, Sey-
chelles, Sierra Leone*, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Suriname*, Swaziland",
Tanzania*, Togo*, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago*, Tuvalu, Uganda*, Vanuaru, Zaire*,
Zambia* and Zimbabwe*. An asterisk indicates GATT contracting party status. The
Fourth ACP-EEC Convention of Lom6, Decision of Dec. 9, 1994, L7604 at 3 (Dec. 19,
1994) (waiver of the Lom6 IV Convention).
For a detailed analysis of the Lom6 Conventions, including a discussion of the insti-
tutions the Conventions have created, see Matthews, supra, at 39-53.
The United States has a program similar to Lom6 called the Caribbean Basin Initia-
tive ("CBI"). The CBI is a program of trade and investment with 23 beneficiary
countries in the Caribbean, Central America and northern South America, created by
the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act of 1983. William H. Cavitt, Western
Hemisphere Free Trade Initiatives, 18 Win. Mitchell L. Rev. 271, 286 n.50 (1992). It
allows "the President to grant duty-free treatment to imports from qualified Carib-
bean Basin nations" and also permits duty-free importation of eligible goods from the
Caribbean nations. Abelardo L. Valdez, Expanding the Concept of Coproduction Be-
yond the Maquiladora: Toward a More Effective Partnership Between the United States
and Mexico, and the Caribbean Basin Countries, 22 Int'l Law. 393, 407 (1988). The
CBI has received mixed reviews on its success. After the implementation of the CBI,
the value of imports from the beneficiary states actually declined 23.7% from 1983 to
1985. Id. at 408-09. Moreover, approximately 87% of the exports from the Caribbean
beneficiary states entered the United States duty-free under the GSP or the most-
favored-nation requirements, so that the CBI was only addressing some 13% of the
exports. Developing North American Trade Relations: Canada, Mexico and the Carib-
bean Basin, 80 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 287, 290 (1986) (remarks of Harry Kopp).
Others point out that non-traditional Caribbean exports to the United States in-
creased 150% from 1983 to 1991, thus showing the CBI's success. Cavitt, supra, at 287.
For a very detailed analysis of the CBI program, as well as a line-by-line analysis of
the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, see Francis W. Foote, The Caribbean
Basin Initiative: Development, Implementation and Application of the Rules of Origin
and Related Aspects of Duty-Free Treatment, 19 Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ. 245
(1985).
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2. Some Legal Issues in the Banana Dispute
The tariff regime under the regulation 6s prejudices bananas from
Latin America in favor of ACP producers. Both Latin and ACP
contracting parties are GATT contracting parties, and the Commu-
nity, by discriminating between these two kinds of GATI" contracting
parties, strikes at the heart of the General Agreement, the Most-Fa-
vored-Nation clause in article I GATT.67 The Most-Favored-Nation
clause can be interpreted to mean that contracting parties such as the
EC cannot discriminate between the GATT contracting parties and, in
this case, between an ACP and a Latin American contracting party.
While the EC's tariff regime is incompatible with the General
Agreement, the Community itself may also violate the General
Agreement. Because all founding EC members were GATT con-
tracting parties,' it was necessary that the EC Treaty be GATT com-
patible.69 But while the EC was intended to be a "common customs
65. Council Regulation 404/93, 1993 OJ. (L 47) 1. See Tony Allen-Mills, EC:
France Dreads Banana Drama-European Single Market, London Sunday Times, Jan.
3, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS File.
At the heart of the European Community is the Common Market. This concept of
the common market should be differentiated from that of the internal market. Article
8a of the EEC Treaty, now known as article 7a of the EC Treaty, provides that an
internal market is "an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of
goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of
this Treaty." EC Treaty art. 7a. This concept of the internal market is enclosed in the
idea of the common market, as mentioned in article 2. EC Treaty art. 2. Article 2 of
the EC Treaty discusses the common market along with the approximation of the
economic policies of the member states, the development of economic activities, a
continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of
the standard of living and closer relations between the States belonging to it. Id. Arti-
cle 3 provides for a common customs tariff, a common commercial policy, the free
movement of goods, services and capital, a common agricultural policy, a common
transport policy, a system of ensuring competition and more. EC Treaty art. 3(a)-(k).
Thus, the concept of the common market as discussed here involves not only the
principle of the free movement of goods but the market vis a vis the world.
66. Council Regulation 404/93, 1993 OQ. (L 47) 1.
67. See EEC-Import Regime for Bananas, Report of the Panel, GATr Doc. DS38/
R (Jan. 18,1994) (restricted) 52 (copy on file with the Fordham Law Review). GATT,
supra note 6, art. I(1) provides that "any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity
granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any
other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product
originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties." Id. art.
1(1).
68. The EEC as a GATT Member, supra note 17, at 32.
69. See id at 35. The entire article XXIV of the General Agreement defines a
customs union, and a few major provisions of the article can be mentioned here. Arti-
cle XXIV(2) of the GATr defines a customs territory as "any territory with respect to
which separate tariffs or other regulations of commerce are maintained for a substan-
tial part of the trade of such territory with other territories." GAIT, supra note 6, art.
XXIV. Article XXIV(4) states that the contracting parties "recognize that the pur-
pose of a customs union or of a free-trade area should be to facilitate trade between
the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the trade of other contracting
parties with such territories." Id. art. XXIV(4).
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union" pursuant to article XXIV of the GATT, the issue of whether
the European Community is compatible with the GATT remains un-
resolved.7" The Community became an established fact in 1968,71 be-
cause the CONTRACTING PARTIES never determined whether the
Community was structured in conformity with article XXIV 72 of the
General Agreement, which sets out the mandatory characteristics of a
common customs union.
The banana dispute involves not only legal obligations but also seri-
ous economic concerns on all sides. At one time, the ACP nations
were colonies of several EC member states, and commodities were the
predominant articles of trade between Europe and her African colo-
nies.73 On the other hand, EC member states lacking a significant co-
lonial presence such as Germany, prefer Latin bananas that are
imported into the Community through German ports.74 Important
differences exist between ACP bananas and Latin American bananas.
Latin bananas are called "dollar bananas" because they are grown by
American multinational corporations such as Dole and Chiquita in
When one examines the EC Treaty, it is fairly obvious that the authors of the reaty
had in mind the General Agreement when they defined the common market and its
functions. Article 2 of the EC Treaty establishes a "common market" with features
delineated in article 3. EC Treaty art. 2. Article 3(a) eliminates customs duties, quan-
titative restrictions and measures having equivalent effect on intra-Community trade.
Id. art. 3(a). Article 3(b) expressly states that the European Community would estab-
lish a common customs tariff and a common commercial policy. Id. art. 3(b).
70. See Legal System, supra note 11, at 214. Currently, the member states of the
Community remain individual WTO members, The EEC as a GATT Member, supra
note 17, at 36, and the Community represents the 15 nations as a group for nearly all
the GATT and WTO activities. See id. at 37. In general, the Community is liable for
the GATT and WTO obligations of all member states. EC Treaty art. 113. The mem-
ber states, however, are responsible for the Finance and Balance of Payments Com-
mittee of the GATr, because the Community is not responsible for the financial
contributions to the GAT'. Ulrich Everling, The Law of the External Economic Rela-
tions of the European Community, in The European Community and GAT' 85, 93
(Meinhard Hilf et al. eds., 1986). While each EC member state controls one vote, the
member states vote as a bloc. Id. European Court of Justice case law has stipulated
that the member states are responsible for taking into consideration Community in-
terests in areas of international obligation where the Community does not act. See
Opinion 1/94, supra note 32, at 108-109.
71. The Community declared the GATT article XXIV procedures closed in 1968.
Legal System, supra note 11, at 212. The article XXIV procedures are a method by
which the CONTRACTING PARTIES can determine whether a free trade agree-
ment conforms to the requirements set out under article XXIV of the General Agree-
ment. Id.
72. GATT, supra note 6, art. XXIV.
73. Matthews, supra note 64, at 23. France originally proposed during the negotia-
tions of the EEC Treaty that her former colonies be incorporated into the Commu-
nity. Id. at 24.
74. Germany: T Port Only Allowed to Import 24,000 Tonnes of Bananas from
Latin America in 1994, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Nov. 9, 1993, at 22, available
in LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS File.
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Latin America on huge plantations." ACP bananas, on the other
hand, are grown by independent farmers. These bananas are twice as
expensive as the Latin bananas."6
Some commentators suggest that the economies of the ACP coun-
tries would collapse if their commodity, bananas, was forced to com-
pete openly with dollar bananas in EuropeZ7 In addition, the banana
trade generates hundreds of millions of dollars for American firms in
the Community, 8 and the dispute threatens thousands of jobs."9 Fur-
thermore, the result of the banana trade dispute will seriously limit
job availability in the transport field for Germany.'
Private parties such as fruit importers, as well as three member
states (Germany, supported by intervenors Belgium and Denmark)
sought judicial relief in the Court of Justice of the European Commu-
nities in an attempt to invalidate the Community's banana tariff re-
gime, but all were unsuccessful. All private actions regarding the
Council Regulation were rejected because the Court of Justice held
that the fruit importers were not "individually concerned" as provided
for in article 173 of the EC Treaty8' and thus lacked standing to chal-
75. See Petition of Chiquita Brands Int'l, Inc. and the Haw. Banana Indus. Assoc.
Before the Section 301 Comm., Office of the U.S. Trade Representative 6 (Sept. 2,
1994) (on file with the Fordham Law Review) (indicating Chiquita, the world's largest
banana company, has plantations primarily in Latin America).
76. The difference in prices between the two kinds of bananas is staggering. In the
United States, where the amount of ACP bananas is negligible, the average price per
box is $9.00. Panama-Commodities: Record Banana Exports for 1994, Inter Press Ser-
vice, Jan. 4, 1995, available in LEXIS, Vorld Library, ALLNWS File. In the Euro-
pean Community, the average price per box is $20.00. Id
77. George Brock, Germany Slips Up Over Europe's Great Banana Split, The
Tunes (London), Oct. 6, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLVS File.
78. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, USTR Kantor Makes Preliminary
Decision that EU Banana Regime Harms U.S. Interests; Initiates Section 301 Investi-
gation of Colombian and Costa Rican Banana Export Practices (Jan. 9, 1995) (on file
with the Fordham Law Review).
79. T Port, supra note 74, at 22 (stating that 1100 jobs will be cut at T Port alone);
Panama: Special Report-Economy Hit by EC Banana Quotas, Lloyd's List, Sept. 7,
1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS File (stating that Panama will
lose 1,300 jobs and $22 million in export earnings).
80. See T Port, supra note 74, at 22.
81. See Case C-288/93, CO.MA.CO SRL v. Council, (June 21, 1993) (LEGIS,
Eurcom library, CYCE file); Case C-287/93, Simba SpA v. Council, (June 21, 1993)
(LEXIS, Eurcom library, CICE file); Case C-286/93, Atlanta AG v. Council, (June 21,
1993) (LEXIS, Eurcom library, CJCE file); Case C-283193, Pacific Fruit Co. Italy SpA
v. Council, (June 21, 1993) (LEXIS, Eurcom library, CICE file); Case C-282/93,
Comafrica SpA v. Council, (June 21,1993) (LEXIS, Eurcom library, CICE file); Case
C-276/93, Chiquita Banana Co. BV v. Council, (June 21, 1993) (LEXIS, Eurcom li-
brary, CJCE file); Case C-262/93, Anton Durbeck GmbH v. Council, (June 21, 1993)
(LEXIS, Eurcom library, CJCE file); Case C-257/93, Leon Van Parijs e.a. v. Council,
(June 21, 1993) (LEXIS, Eurcom library, CJCE file); Case C-256193, Pacific Fruit Co.
NV and Pacific Fruit Co. BV v. Council, (June 21, 1993) (LEXIS, Eurcom library,
CJCE file).
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lenge the Community act.' Germany, despite its opposition to the
regime, could not seek dispute resolution at the GATT because "the
rules contained in GATT govern only the Community's relations with
the other contracting parties and cannot be applied within the Com-
munity itself. 8 3 Germany instead brought an action against the
Council of the European Union on the banana tariff regime pursuant
to article 173 of the EC Treaty. Under article 173, the Court of Justice
shall have competency in actions brought by a member state to review
legal acts of the Community's institutions that infringe the EC Treaty
or "any rule of law relating to its application. '" ' Germany challenged
that, inter alia, the tariff regime violated the GATT and, as such, the
82. This result is somewhat ironic because the Court of Justice in another case
writes of the importance of individuals' pursuit of rights under the EC Treaty. As Mr.
Petersmann pointed out, the Court in Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse
administratie der belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1, 2 C.M.L.R. 105 (1963), encouraged pri-
vate individuals to safeguard their interests and stated that their challenges serve to
supplement articles 169 and 170 of the EC Treaty. Application of GATT, supra note
10, at 436 (quoting Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos, 1963 E.C.R. at 13, 2 C.M.L.R. at
130 ("The vigilance of individuals concerned to protect their rights amounts to an
effective supervision in addition to the supervision entrusted by articles 169 and 170 to
the diligence of the Commission and of the Member States.")).
German fruit importers have announced their intention to contest the violation of
their property rights by the Community to the German Federal Constitutional Court.
EU: Court of Justice's Ruling Over Bananas Has Not Ended Internal and External
Dispute Over Community Regime, Agence Europe, Oct. 8, 1994, available in LEXIS,
World Library, ALLNWS File. The German Constitutional Court has threatened to
rule after the ECJ's ruling if the German Court considers that the ECJ failed to pro-
tect the fundamental rights guaranteed by the German Constitution. See George A.
Bermann et al., Cases and Materials on European Community Law 224 (1993) (citing
Case 2 BvR 197183, In re Application of Winsche Handelsgesellschaft, 73 BvertGE
339, 3 C.M.L.R. 225 (1986) (Federal Constitutional Court (2d Senate))). If the Ger-
man Constitutional Court should find that the Court of Justice in these banana cases
failed to protect fundamental rights such as that of property, then it could issue a
ruling contrary to the ECJ opinion. Such a ruling would lead to a constitutional crisis
within the European Community.
83. Case 266/81, SocietA Italiana per l'Oleodotto Transalpino v. Ministero delle
Finanze, 1983 E.C.R. 731, 776, [1983-85 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,001, at 14,031 (1983).
84. Article 173 of the EC Treaty states:
The Court of Justice shall review the legality... of acts of the Council,...
other than recommendations and opinions ....
It shall for this purpose have jurisdiction in actions brought by a Member
State, the Council or the Commission on grounds of lack of competence,
infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of this
Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application, or misuse of powers.
EC Treaty art. 173.
Germany had lost an earlier application for a preliminary injunction against the
Council to prevent the regulation from going into effect. Case 280/93 R, Germany v.
Council, (June 29, 1993) (LEXIS, Eurcom library, CJCE file). An application for a
preliminary injunction is necessary because article 185 of the EC Treaty states that an
action contested before the Court of Justice is not suspended unless the Court orders
the suspension of the act. EC Treaty art. 185.
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act was invalid under article 173 of the EC Treaty. The Court rejected
Germany's challenge in Germany v. Council. 5
B. The Current Situation
The GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES never definitively con-
cluded whether the Lom6 Conventions providing for the Commu-
nity's non-reciprocal preferential treatment of ACP goods are
compatible with the GATT. 6 As a result of the banana trade dis-
pute,' the Community and the ACP countries applied to the GAIT
Council for a waiver of the Lom6 IV Convention. The waiver was
issued in December of 1994.1
1. GATT's Waiver of the Lom6 Convention
Article XXV(5) of the General Agreement provides the legal basis
for a waiver:
In exceptional circumstances not elsewhere provided for in this
Agreement, the CONTRACTING PARTIES may waive an obliga-
tion imposed upon a contracting party by this Agreement; Provided
that any such decision shall be approved by a two-thirds majority of
the votes cast and that such majority shall comprise more than half
of the contracting parties. The CONTRACING PARTIES may
also by such a vote
(i) define certain categories of exceptional circumstances to which
other voting requirements shall apply for the waiver of obligations,
and
(ii) prescribe such criteria as may be necessary for the application
of this paragraph.89
The article, however, gives no criteria as to how the CONTRACTING
PARTIES should arrive at their conclusion. The article therefore ef-
fectively gives the CONTRACTING PARTIES the authority to make
85. Case C-280/93, Germany v. Council at 1 119 (Oct. 5, 1994) (LEXIS, Eurcom
library, CASES file). This Note will not address the second lawsuit filed by Germany
in the Court of Justice on July 25, 1994. In this second case, Germany asks the Court
to determine whether the Commission's Framework Agreement of March 29, 1994,
with the four Latin American countries regarding the banana tariff, is valid. Belgium:
Court to Rule on German EU Banana Case Wednesday, Reuter Newswire, Oct. 4,
1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS File. In the second suit, Ger-
many is asking the Court to strike down the Framework Agreement. The Latin
American countries would then lose the Community's concessions and thus pursue
the matter again with the GATI' or WTO.
86. The Community has invoked article XXIV as its legal basis for concluding
preferential trade agreements with more than 100 countries, including the ACP coun-
tries. The EEC as a GATT Member, supra note 17, at 42.
87. EU/ACP: Caribbean and Commission Seek to Protect Lomi from GATT, Eu-
ropean Report, Oct. 5, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS File;
Debra Percival, Caribbean-Europe: EU urged to Protect Small Island Trade, Inter
Press Service, Oct. 3, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLNVS File.
88. Lomi waiver, supra note 64, at 1.
89. GATT, supra note 6, art. XXV(5).
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a purely political decision in granting or denying the waiver. While no
legal argument is required in an article XXV(5) consideration, the
Community and the ACP may have offered at least one legal argu-
ment during the GATT Council meeting of December 8, 1994.
Community and ACP contracting parties generally maintain that
the Lom6 Conventions create a customs union pursuant to article
XXIV of the General Agreement. Where a proposed customs union
does not fully conform with article XXIV(5) through (9), the agree-
ment nevertheless can be approved if a two-thirds majority of the
CONTRACTING PARTIES is in favor of such approval.90 Such a
waiver need not be limited in time, and a common customs union can
be of infinite duration. 91
The Community and the ACP nations rushed to obtain a waiver
before the end of 1994 because the WTO began work on January 1,
1995. A waiver under the WTO is much harder to obtain and to main-
tain than a waiver under the General Agreement. Article IX(3) of the
WTO Agreement provides:
In exceptional circumstances, the Ministerial Conference may de-
cide to waive an obligation imposed on a Member by this Agree-
ment or any of the Multilateral Trade Agreements, provided that
90. Id. art. XXIV(10).
91. See id. art. XXIV. One arguable example of a customs union provided for
under article XXIV GATT is the European Community. The Community had previ-
ously defended regional trade agreements, such as the Lom6 Conventions, as prelimi-
nary steps to true regional free trade agreements provided for under article XXIV of
the General Agreement. Robert E. Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law: The
Evolution of the Modem GATT Legal System 24 (1993) [hereinafter Enforcing Inter-
national Trade Law]. Each time the agreements were challenged by another GATT
contracting party, the Community won a pragmatic "wait-and-see" position from
CONTRACTING PARTIES, and the issue was prolonged until it was no longer an
issue. This strategy mirrors the Community's success in obtaining the de facto ap-
proval of the European Economic Community by the CONTRACTING PARTIES.
See id. at 24. Despite the GATT's pragmatic "wait-and-see" approach, these prefer-
ential trade agreements have always been a source of friction between the United
States and the Community, especially those entered into between the EC and most of
the Mediterranean countries. See id. at 38-40.
All of these agreements were cast as preliminary versions of article XXIV regional
agreements, some looking to full EC membership (Greece, Spain and Portugal) and
others looking to eventual free trade areas (Malta, Cyprus, Thrkey, Lebanon, Israel,
Egypt, Thnisia, Algeria and Morocco). Id. at 39. As one commentator noted, all of
these agreements did not satisfy the formal requirements of article XXIV in that they
lacked a definite schedule, within a reasonable time, for the completion of the free
trade area or the full common customs union membership. Id. The free trade area
groups in particular were seen as blatant "preferential agreements designed to retain
(and usually expand) various preferential arrangements that had existed before crea-
tion of the EC." Id. Needless to say, none of these agreements have had their legal
status resolved by the CONTRACTING PARTIES. Id. For some of these agree-
ments, such as the ones with Greece, Spain and Portugal, the issue is moot because
these countries are now member states of the Community.
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any such decision shall be taken by three fourths92 of the Members
unless otherwise provided for in this paragraph. 93
Under the WTO, a waiver requires a three-fourths approval as op-
posed to the two-thirds required under the GATT. Article IX(4)
states that the waiver is provisional, and any waiver granted for more
than one year must be reviewed by the Ministerial Conference begin-
ning no later than one year after the grant of the waiver and thereafter
annually until the waiver expires.94 During the review, the Ministerial
Conference is required to examine whether the exceptional conditions
justifying the waiver still exist and whether the waiver is still re-
quired.95 In addition, the Ministerial Conference, based on the annual
review, "may extend, modify or terminate the waiver." 96
The Lom6 waiver that was granted, L17604, provides for a deroga-
tion from the obligations of article I(1) of the General Agreement for
the Community and the ACP nations as required by the relevant pro-
visions of the Lom6 IV Convention until February 29, 2000, when the
convention expires. Although the Community has obtained this
waiver, the banana dispute is not resolved. One of the reasons the
waiver was granted was because one of Lom6's purposes is to benefit
the ACP countries.97 The waiver, however, provides that if the prefer-
ential treatment for products is being applied inconsistently with the
reasons for the waiver, any contracting party may bring the matter
before the CONTRACTING PARTIES.98 Moreover, the "waiver
shall not preclude the right of affected contracting parties to have re-
course to articles XXH and XXIII of the General Agreement.""
92. "A decision to grant a waiver in respect of any obligation subject to a transi-
tion period or a period for staged implementation that the requesting Member has not
performed by the end of the relevant period shall be taken only by consensus." WVTO
Agreement, supra note 17, art. IX(3) n.4.
93. Id. art. IX(3).
94. 1& art. IX(4).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Lomg waiver, supra note 64, at 1.
98. See id. at 2.
99. Id. Therefore, Guatemala and the United States will have an opportunity to
raise the banana issue under the WTO because the Framework Agreement between
the EC and the Latin countries that settled the dispute is inconsistent with the Gen-
eral Agreement. The United States issued a statement with the waiver that while the
United States has always supported a Lom6 waiver, the United States notes its objec-
tions to the Framework Agreement because it is "designed to protect the economic
interests of certain EU firms at the expense of non-EU companies rather than to help
Lome [sic] banana exports." Id. at 4. The World Bank has just issued a study on the
EC banana regime, stating that the extra cost of bananas in the Common Market is
actually benefiting European companies that market bananas, not the ACP countries.
See Guy de Jonqui~res, EU Banana Policy "Perverse and Inefficient" Says World
Bank, Fmn. Times, Jan. 20, 1995, at 4. The United States Trade Representative seems
to believe Chiquita's claim that
the Framework Agreement gives to the signatory Latin Americans guaran-
teed inflated shares of the third country quota, and with that guarantee, the
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2. Policy Arguments on the Waiver
A number of strong policy arguments exist for a Lom6 waiver.
First, as one commentator noted, "the drive to impose identical condi-
tions of trade worldwide is misplaced because not all countries start
out on an equal footing."'"° The theory argues that developing and
under-developed countries must be treated differently if they are to
function on an equal footing with developed countries. 1°1 Developing
countries will always be behind in economic development unless they
are given time to stimulate their economies.
The counter argument to this theory, however, is that developing
countries should not be made dependant upon preferential trade
agreements. The European Community, by offering these benefits to
developing countries, is only encouraging the ACP nations' depen-
dency upon EC aid and upon the common market. Opponents of the
waiver argue that the only way to encourage development in ACP
nations is to place them in as close to a free market economy as possi-
ble, thereby forcing them to streamline their businesses and learn to
compete with developed nations.
The second policy argument for a waiver is that "small island states,
heavily dependant on one commodity[,] ... always face trade inequali-
ties."'" 2 These states encounter difficulties in developing industries
and factories to compete with the emerging markets in Asia. Instead
such nations should improve the quality of their commodities or, in
the alternative, diversify so that they are not dependant upon a single
commodity. According to this argument, grants to developing coun-
tries of preferential market treatment only discourage efforts to im-
prove quality and production.
authority to impose confiscatory export licensing fees and charges on U.S.
banana marketing companies and similarly situated firms.
Petition, supra note 75, at 51. The United States and Guatemala can challenge the
Framework Agreement because the assistance of European banana firms at the ex-
pense of the American multinational corporations is inconsistent with the principles
of helping ACP nations develop their economies, which is mentioned in the recital of
the waiver. Id. at 1.
The Framework Agreement is part of the Uruguay Round negotiations. See Corri-
gendum to the European Communities' Schedule of Concessions for Agricultural
Products as Regards Bananas, Schedule LXXX (on file with the Fordham Law
Review).
100. EU/ACP: Caribbean and Commission Seek to Protect Lomd from GAT, Eu-
ropean Information Service, Oct. 5, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library,
ALLNWS File.
101. Preferential trade agreements such as the Lom6 Conventions will be of less
importance as international trade agreements move more and more towards liberali-
zation. Accord Matthews, supra note 64, at 44. This does not include the extraordi-
nary mechanisms of STABEX and SYSMIN under the Lom6 Conventions. See
George A. Bermann et al., Cases and Materials on European Community Law 949
(1993).
102. Debra Percival, Caribbean-Europe: EU Urged to Protect Small Island Trade,
Inter Press Service, Oct. 3, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS File.
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3. Political Arguments Regarding the Waiver
The most important argument in support of the waiver is not re-
lated to the needs of developing countries; it is merely politics. If the
Latin GATT contracting parties and the United States refused to vote
for the waiver, repercussions to the United States and the Latin
American countries were certain to result. First, a refusal to vote for
the waiver would have been foolish, in light of the fact that the Euro-
pean Community and the ACP contracting parties together had suffi-
cient votes by themselves to satisfy the required majority under article
XXIV. °3 Second, if the United States voted against the European
Community, the Community could retaliate against the United States
in another vote in another organization. Third, the number of GATT
contracting parties in the Lom6 Convention is quite large, and the
United States and Latin America could not afford to antagonize such
a large number of contracting parties. Finally, the relationship be-
tween the GAIT and developing countries is not one of mutual admi-
ration; many developing countries look unfavorably upon free trade
agreements. The countries believe that a free trade system hinders
their abilities to nurture their industries. 1' 4
C. European Court of Justice Case Law on GATT
In addition to the GATT organization, the European Court of Jus-
tice is another forum for GAIT disputes. The Court has issued at
least eleven judgments regarding the current banana dispute. 105 ECJ
case law includes a large number of judgments analyzing the General
Agreement and explaining the Court's refusal to grant the General
Agreement direct effect m6 These cases conclude that the General
Agreement is a flexible document that fails to confer legal rights on
any party.10 7 An examination of the Community legal order and the
ECJ case law reveals many insights into the weaknesses of the Gen-
eral Agreement and the GATT system and furthers an understanding
of why the GAIT system is inadequate to resolve the banana dispute.
103. See supra notes 26 and 64.
104. See Bartram S. Brown, Developing Countries in the International Trade Order,
14 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 347, 357 (1994). The General Agreement has never provided
special provisions for developing countries, unlike the Havana Charter creating the
ITO. See id. at 358. None of the ITO Charter's provisions for developing countries
are in the General Agreement. See id. at 359.
105. See supra note 81.
106. See infra notes 163-87 and accompanying text.
107. But see infra notes 122-31 and accompanying text (discussing cases interpret-
ing Regulation 2641/84).
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1. The European Community Legal Order
European Community law is a new legal order imposed across fron-
tiers. °8 Within this new legal order, the Court of Justice ensures "that
in the interpretation and application of this Treaty[,] the law is ob-
served."'1 9 The EC Treaty also serves as a Constitution and stands
supreme in the Community legal order, even to a member state's con-
stitution." 0 The treaty supremacy doctrine was enunciated when the
Court of Justice was forced to address conflicts in which Community
law provided for a remedy prohibited by British constitutional prac-
tice."' In strong words supporting Treaty supremacy, the Court of
Justice explained that Community law must be interpreted as meaning
that "a national court which, in a case before it concerning Commu-
nity law, considers that the sole obstacle which precludes it from
granting interim relief is a rule of national law, must disapply that
rule.""' 2 The Court of Justice also has jurisdiction to give preliminary
rulings concerning the validity and interpretation of acts of Commu-
nity institutions when a court of a member state refers a question of
Community law to the Court." 3 The list of Community institutions in
article 173 includes the Council of Ministers1 4 and the General
Agreement is considered an act for article 173 purposes.115 From the
time an agreement becomes effective, "the provisions of such an
108. See Case 6/64, Costa v. Ente Nazionale Energia Elettrica, 1964 E.C.R. 585,
593, C.M.L.R. 425, 455 (1964) ("The EEC Treaty has created its own legal system
which, on the entry into force of the Treaty, became an integral part of the legal
systems of the Member States and which their courts are bound to apply."); Case 26/
62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse administratie der belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1,
12, C.M.L.R. 105, 129 (1963) ("[T]he Community constitutes a new legal order of
international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights
109. EC Treaty art. 164 (emphasis added). Because the provisions of the GAIT
must be applied uniformly throughout the Community, it is the Court of Justice that
must determine the scope and effect of the GAT and whether it has direct effect at
all. Joined cases 267 to 269/81, Amministrazione delle Fmanze dello Stato v. Societh
Petrolifera Italiana SpA, 1983 E.C.R. 801, 828, 1 C.M.L.R. 354, 378 (1984).
110. Case C-213/89, The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transp. ex parte:
Factortame Ltd, 1990 E.C.R. 1-2433, 1-2474, 3 C.M.L.R. 1, 30 (1990). The Court of
Justice in that case held that Community law prevails over member state constitu-
tions. See id. at 1-2473, 3 C.M.L.R. at 29. In the particular case, the member state
involved, the United Kingdom, does not have a written constitution. Thus, the word-
ing of the judgment focused on "judicial practice" rather than on the written constitu-
tion. See id. The case firmly established that the primacy of the EC Treaty is
indisputable. Id.
111. Id. at 1-2450, 3 C.M.L.R. at 6.
112. Id. at 1-2473, 3 C.M.L.R. at 30.
113. EC Treaty art. 177(b).
114. EC Treaty art. 173.
115. International agreements established between the Community through its in-
stitutions and a non-member state constitute an act for the purposes of EC Teaty
article 177(b), which gives the Court competence to hear questions referred to it by a
court or a tribunal of a member state. Case 181/73, Haegeman v. Belgium, 1974
E.C.R. 449, 459, 1 C.M.L.R. 515, 530 (1975). Provisions of agreements qualifying as
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agreement form an integral part of the Community legal system;
within the framework of that system the Court has jurisdiction to give
preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation of such an
agreement."116
Article 173 provides that the Court of Justice, for the purpose of
reviewing the legality of acts adopted by the institutions of the Com-
munity, shall "have jurisdiction in actions brought by . . . Member
State[s] ... on grounds of... infringement of this Treaty or of any rule
of law relating to its application, or misuse of powers." 1 7 For a party
to have standing to sue under EC Treaty article 173, an act, other than
an opinion or recommendation, must be intended to produce legal ef-
fects vis d vis the parties."'
The first inquiry when approaching ECJ case law on the GATT is:
What is the legal effect of treaties to which the Community belongs,
and where do such treaties stand in relation to other legal tiers of
Community law? In other words, can the GATT overrule a piece of
Community legislation? This is the question that Germany wanted
the Court to answer in its favor when it instituted an action against the
Council under article 173 of the EC Treaty." 9
Public international law allows the Community and a non-member
state to agree upon the domestic legal effect of international agree-
ments.1' A line of ECJ GATT cases has developed where the legal
basis for legislation was the General Agreement and through which
the internal effect of the General Agreement was thus accepted. 2'
acts under article 177(b) "form an integral part of Community law," id. at 460, 1
C.M.L.R. at 530, and would thus constitute an act for article 173 purposes.
116. Case 12/86, Demirel v. Stadt Schw5bisch Gmflnd, 1987 E.C.R. 3719, 3750, 1
C.M.L.R. 421, 436-37 (1989). It should be stated that this discussion makes no as-
sumption of whether the Community legal system is dualistic, meaning that interna-
tional treaties such as the GATT do not have legal effect in the Community unless the
Community specifically invokes them or relies on them. A discussion of whether the
Community legal system is a monistic or dualistic system is beyond the scope of this
Note. For an analysis of this issue, see Pieter VerLoren van Themaat, The Impact of
the Case Law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities on the Economic
World Order, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1422, 1435-37 (1984).
117. EC Treaty art. 173. In public international law, the date on which the con-
tested domestic legislation is adopted in reference to the international treaty can de-
termine whether the treaty will have domestic effect. See EC Treaty art. 234.
118. EC Treaty art. 173.
119. Case C-280/93, Germany v. Council at [ 103 (Oct. 5, 1994) (LEXIS, Eurcom
library, CASES file).
120. Case 104/81, Hauptzollamt Mainz v. C.A. Kupferberg & Cie., 1982 E.C.R.
3641, 3663, 1 C.M.L.R. 1, 21 (1983).
121. In Germany v. Council, the Court recognized that the General Agreement can
have direct effect "only if the Community intended to implement a particular obliga-
tion entered into within the framework of GAIT, or if the Community act expressly
refers to specific provisions of GATT, that the Court can review the lawfulness of the
Community act in question from the point of view of the GATr rules." Case C-280/
93, Germany v. Council at 1 111 (Oct. 5, 1994) (LEXIS, Eurcom library, CASES file)
(citations omitted).
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2. ECJ Case Law
One of the few cases where the Court of Justice has recognized the
direct effect of the General Agreement in the Community legal order
is Fid~ration de l'industrie de l'huilerie de la CEE (FEDIOL) v. Com-
mission.'2 2 FEDIOL involved Council Regulation 2641/84, which
strengthened the common commercial policy and enhanced protec-
tions against illicit commercial practices, including anti-dumping
acts."z Advocate General'2 4 Van Gerven argued that where the in-
ternational agreement, in that case the General Agreement, is used as
the legal basis for the legislation and as "the assessment criterion for
declaring unlawful certain conduct of non-member countries," the
General Agreement is "substantially incorporated" into the legisla-
tion." - The Court of Justice in FEDIOL agreed with the Advocate
General, holding that the Community legislation in dispute entitled
"the economic agents concerned to rely on the GATT provisions" by
the regulation's reference to the General Agreement in its text.126
Thus, where Community legislation directly refers to the General
Agreement, the Agreement will have direct effect, and private parties
may challenge a violation of the Community's obligations under the
referenced General Agreement provision. 7
Another case where the Court recognized the direct effect of the
General Agreement is N. T.N. Toyo Bearing Co. v. Council.12 8 While
the judgment failed to address whether or not the General Agreement
had internal effect, Advocate General Mancini analyzed the plaintiff's
complaint on the merits by referencing the General Agreement and
Community law. 129 The ECJ seemed to agree with the Advocate
General.130 The anti-dumping cases establish that under EC law, if
Community legislation is specifically adopted to comply with the
122. Case 70/87, 1989 E.C.R. 1781, 2 C.M.L.R. 489 (1991).
123. See Council Regulation 2641/84 on the Strengthening of the Common Com-
merical Policy with Regard in Particular to Protection Against Illicit Commercial
Practices, 1984 O.J. (L 252) 1; Council Regulation 522/94, 1994 0.3. (L 66) 10.
124. An advocate general is a full member of the Court of Justice, who delivers a
reasoned opinion before the Court issues its judgment. K.P.E. Lasok, The European
Court of Justice: Practice and Procedure 87 (2d ed. 1994). The advocate general does
not participate in the deliberations of the judgment, but the judges do consider his
opinion in the drafting of the judgment. Id. Currently, all the advocates general at the
European Court of Justice are men.
125. 1989 E.C.R. at 1805, 2 C.M.L.R. at 501-02.
126. Id. at 1831, 2 C.M.L.R. at 525.
127. For example, the Commission recently issued a large number of proposals to
implement the results of the Uruguay Round. Uruguay Round Implementing Legisla-
tion, COM(94)414 final. If these acts were challenged in the Community, the direct
effect of the GATT regarding these acts should not be questioned.
128. Case 240/84, 1987 E.C.R. 1809, 2 C.M.L.R. 76 (1989).
129. Id. at 1836, 2 C.M.L.R. at 90.
130. Id. at 1858, 2 C.M.L.R. at 112 (analyzing the case on substantive law). In Mi-
nolta Camera Co. v. Council, the internal effect of the GATT was not an issue because
the Court was ready to analyze the complaint on its merits, but the complaint was
[Vol. 631308
1995] GOING BANANAS 1309
Community's obligations under the General Agreement, the Commu-
nity must ensure that such legislation does not violate the General
Agreement.1 31
3. The Concept of "Direct Effects"
In the banana trade dispute, the regulation setting forth the tariff
regime is not intended to implement the General Agreement. 132 Ger-
man banana importers, however, can still challenge the validity of the
regime based on the General Agreement only if the General Agree-
ment had direct effect.
"Direct effects" is a legal doctrine created by the Court of Justice
that determines the internal effect of an international treaty. 133 The
term "direct effects" refers to whether a particular provision of Com-
munity law confers rights upon individuals so that they may challenge
a Community act on that basis.13 The Court of Justice applies a two
prong test in its determination of whether the Community is bound by
the General Agreement.
a. The First Prong of the "Direct Effects" Doctrine
The first prong of the doctrine questions whether the Community is
bound by the particular provision of the General Agreement at is-
sue.135 The Community is bound by the General Agreement, and the
EC Treaty supports this position. 36
Two EC Treaty articles in particular support this position: article
110,1' which declares the Community's interest in a growing world
defeated on other grounds. Case C-178/87, Minolta Camera Co. v. Council, 1992
E.C.R. 1-1577, 1-1630.
131. Case 69/89, Nakajima All Precision Co. v. Council, 1991 E.C.R. 1-2069, 1-2178
(citing Case 104/81, Hauptzollamt Mainz v. C.A. Kupferberg & Cie., 1982 E.C.R.
3641, 3662, 1 C.M.L.R. 1, 20 (1983)).
132. See Council Regulation 404/93, 1993 OJ. (L 47) 1.
133. Case C-280/93, Germany v. Council at 1 110 (Oct. 5, 1994) (LEXIS, Eurcom
library, CASES file) (stating that the test is whether GAT" contains unconditional,
clear and precise obligations so as to be directly applicable in the Community); see
also Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse administratie der belastingen,
1963 E.C.R. 1, 13, C.M.L.R. 105, 130 (1963) (stating that the test is whether the Treaty
contained a clear and unconditional prohibition "not qualified by any reservation on
the part of states which would make its implementation conditional upon a positive
legislative measure enacted under national law. The very nature of this prohibition
makes it ideally adapted to produce direct effects .... ).
134. The term also means whether the General Agreement has any internal effect
so that an individual could challenge a Community act as a violation of the General
Agreement. See Case C-280/93, Germany v. Council, Opinion of Advocate General
Gulmann at 125-26 (June 8, 1994) (LEXIS, Eurcom library, CASES file).
135. Joined cases 21 to 24172, International Fruit Co. NV v. Produktschap voor
Groenten en Fruit, 1972 E.C.R. 1219, 1226, 2 C.M.L.R. 1, 20-21 (1975).
136. Id. at 1226, 2 C.M.L.R. at 21.
137. EEC Treaty art. 110 [as in effect in 19871 provides:
By establishing a customs union between themselves Member States aim to
contribute, in the common interest, to the harmonious development of world
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
economy, and article 234, which provides that agreements entered
into before the effective date of the EC Treaty are not affected by the
EC Treaty.131 The Community is bound because it assumed the tasks
relating to tariff and trade policy by virtue of articles 111 and 113 of
the EC Treaty.139 Article 113 gives the Community competence in the
area of negotiating tariff and trade agreements, naturally including the
General Agreement. The Community's Common Customs Tariff re-
placed the national customs tariffs of the Community member states
on July 1, 1968. Thus, from that date forward, the Court of Justice
recognized the Community as a common customs union, as defined
under article XXIV of the General Agreement, and revealed that
"Community authorities alone have jurisdiction to interpret and de-
termine the legal effect" of the General Agreement.140 The Court of
Justice further noted that the CONTRACTING PARTIES have rec-
ognized the Community as the entity representing the member
states.14' Given all of these reasons, the first prong of the test is
satisfied. 42
b. The Second Prong of the "Direct Effects" Doctrine
The second prong of the test is that a challenged regulation must be
capable of producing "direct effects" in the Community.1 43 The Court
created the doctrine of "direct effects" in Van Gend en Loos.'44 The
trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and the
lowering of customs barriers.
The common commercial policy shall take into account the favourable ef-
fect which the abolition of customs duties between Member States may have
on the increase in the competitive strength of undertakings in those States.
Id.
138. EC Treaty art. 234.
139. 1972 E.C.R. at 1227, 2 C.M.L.R. at 21; accord Case 38/75, Douaneagent der
NV Nederlandse Spoorwegen v. Inspecteur der invoerrechten en accijnzen, 1975
E.C.R. 1439, 1450, 1 C.M.L.R. 167, 178 (1976). The Treaty on European Union has
repealed article 111, because the common market objectives have already been
achieved. EEC Treaty art. 111 (as in effect in 1987) set forth provisions during the
transitional period of the completion of the common market. EEC Teaty art. 111 (as
in effect in 1987).
The Court of Justice recently issued Opinion 1/94, in which it explains that where
the external trade affairs of the Community fall outside of article 113, both the Com-
munity and the member states have shared competence. Opinion 1/94, supra note 32,
at 106-10. While they share competence, they are nonetheless bound by the treaty
to cooperate. Id.
140. 1975 E.C.R. at 1449, 1 C.M.L.R. at 177; see also Joined Cases 290 and 291/81,
Compagnia Singer SpA v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato, 1983 E.C.R.
847, 862 (holding that "interpretation is a matter exclusively for the courts of the
Member States").
141. See Joined Cases 21 to 24/72, International Fruit Co. NV v. Produktschap voor
Groenten en Fruit, 1972 E.C.R. 1219, 1227, 2 C.M.L.R. 1, 21 (1975).
142. See id. at 1227, 2 C.M.L.R. at 22.
143. See infra notes 162-87 and accompanying text.
144. Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse administratie der belastingen,
1963 E.C.R. 1, 13, C.M.L.R. 105, 130-31 (1963).
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question before the Court was whether a private party could rely on
an EC Treaty article in its complaint.14 5 To determine whether the EC
Treaty article produced "direct effects," the Court first considered the
spirit, the general scheme and the wording of the provisions of the EC
Treaty."4 The second relevant inquiry was whether the treaty article
contained a negative obligation unqualified "by any reservation on the
part of states which would make its implementation conditional upon
a positive legislative measure enacted under national law." '147 The
ECJ concluded that the article in question produced "direct effects" in
that its provisions provided individuals with rights upon which they
could rely."4
While the discussion of this Note involves the direct effect of the
General Agreement and not the EC Treaty, the test remains the
same.14 9 For a provision in an international agreement involving the
Community to produce direct effects, the wording of the provision,
along with the purpose and the nature of the agreement, must illus-
trate the existance of a "clear and precise" duty. Such duty need not
be implemented by the Community for it to have direct effect.15 0 Rel-
evant considerations are the spirit, the general scheme and the word-
ing of the General Agreement, whether the particular provision of the
General Agreement contains a negative obligation that is uncondi-
tional and whether implementation requires an affirmative act by the
Community.
c. The ECJ's Surprise Ruling on the EC Treaty Article 173
In Gennany v. Council, "direct effect" should have been irrelevant
because a member state is a "privileged plaintiff" who can challenge
the validity of the acts of Community institutions.' 5' Private plaintiffs,
however, are limited by the second paragraph of article 173 when they
bring actions to challenge Community acts.5 2 Many commentators
145. Id. at 11, C.M.L.R. at 129.
146. Id at 12, C.M.L.R. at 129.
147. Id at 13, C.M.L.R. at 130.
148. See 1963 E.C.R. at 13, C.M.L.R. at 130. The Court of Justice always requires
that the international agreement being used as the basis for challenging a Community
act must first be "capable of creating rights of which interested parties may avail
themselves in a court of law." Case 9/73, Schitlter v. Hauptzollamt ULrrach, 1973
E.C.R. 1135, 1157, [1974 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCII) '1 8233, at
9143-15 (1974); Joined Cases 21 to 24/72, International Fruit Co. NV v. Produktschap
voor Groenten en Fruit, 1972 E.C.R. 1219, 1226,2 C.M.L.R. 1, 21 (1975). The Court
sees this as a justified criterion under public international law principles where private
parties seek to "invoke violations of rules of international law," especially because
most international treaties do not provide for private rights. Impact of the Case Law,
supra note 116, at 1432.
149. See 1972 E.C.R. at 1226-27, 2 C.M.L.R. at 20-22.
150. Case 12/86, Demirel v. Stadt Schwlibisch Gmilnd, 1987 E.C.R. 3719, 3752, 1
C.M.L.R. 421, 438 (1989).
151. EC Treaty art. 173.
152. Id.
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believe that Community institutions and member states have standing
to challenge any Community infringements of the General Agree-
ment. 153 The Court of Justice, however, in Germany v. Council,'54
placed the burdens of a private plaintiff on Germany, a member
state. 55 Without providing a detailed explanation, the Court of Jus-
tice ignored the language in article 173 and placed Germany in the
position of a private individual.
Advocate General Gulmann'56 similarly failed to expand on this as-
tounding holding. Advocate General Gulmann stated that "GATr
belongs to the majority of international agreements which do not de-
mand a special internal guarantee of respect for their rules."'15 7 The
Advocate General stated that regardless of article 173, member states
and private plaintiffs cannot base a challenge on an agreement that
does not have direct effect.' 58
The Court of Justice appeared to agree with the Advocate Gen-
eral's arguments. After noting the "particularities" of the GATT, the
Court explained:
Those features of GATT, from which the Court concluded that an
individual within the Community cannot invoke it in a court to chal-
lenge the lawfulness of a Community act, also preclude the Court
from taking provisions of GATT into consideration to assess the
lawfulness of a regulation in an action brought by a Member State
under the first paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty. The special
features noted above show that the GATT' rules are not uncondi-
153. Commentators cited as support EC Treaty articles 169, 170, the first or second
paragraphs of art. 173 and art. 175 of the Treaty. See Everling, supra note 70, at 98;
Marc Maresceau, The GATT in the Case-law of the European Court of Justice, in The
European Community and GATT 107, 114 (Meinhard Hilf et al. eds., 1986) ("Mem-
ber States, Council or Commission could, although the case has never arisen, initiate
proceedings under art. 173 § 1 if they consider that a Community act was taken in
conflict with obligations which stem from the GAIT."); Impact of the Case Law,
supra note 116, at 1433 ("[A] Member State could attack a Community measure for
violation of international obligations under article 173, even if such obligations were
not self-executing."); Application of GATT, supra note 10, at 421 ("Individual Mem-
ber States may likewise invoke international GATI obligations as a means of resisting
protectionist pressures within the Community or from national interest groups.").
Article 169 is implicated when a member state fails to fulfill its part of the Commu-
nity's obligation under the General Agreement. See EC Treaty art. 169. The only
distinction between articles 169 and 170 is that under article 170, it is another member
state who believes that a member state has failed to fulfill its obligation. EC Treaty
art. 170. But article 175 involves a situation where a Community institution has failed
to act, thereby permitting a private right of action for those individually concerned or
an action by another institution or a member state to be brought before the Court of
Justice. See EC Treaty art. 175.
154. Case C-280/93, Germany v. Council (Oct. 5, 1994) (LEXIS, Eurcom library,
CASES file).
155. Id. at 109.
156. Mr. Gulmann is now a judge of the Court of Justice.
157. Case C-280/93, Germany v. Council, Opinion of Advocate General Gulmann
at 129 (Oct. 5, 1994) (LEXIS, Eurcom library, CASES file).
158. Id. at 135.
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tional and that an obligation to recognize them as rules of interna-
tional law which are directly applicable in the domestic legal
systems of the contracting parties cannot be based on the spirit, gen-
eral scheme or terms of GATE.15 9
While the Court failed to address the issue of a privileged plaintiff
under article 173, one textual reading could explain the Court's inter-
pretation. The fourth paragraph of article 173 establishes the require-
ments for a private plaintiff to challenge a Community act. One of the
requirements is that the proceeding be instituted "under the same
conditions."'" A possible argument is that the Court interpreted this
phrase to mean that a member state and a private plaintiff can only
sustain an action under the same conditions.
Thus, member states may not challenge Community violations of
the General Agreement or any other international treaties that bind
the Community if those agreements do not have direct effect.
Germany v. Council is significant because a member state is re-
strained from challenging an act in the Court of Justice. Within the
Community's Council of Ministers, consensus is no longer required in
the field of common commercial policy. If a member state loses the
qualified majority vote in the Council, the state may be unable to chal-
lenge the action under article 173.161
4. How the ECJ's Reasoning Accurately Reflects the GATT
System
The European Court's perceptions make clearer the differing char-
acteristics of the GATT system and the WTO, and the WTO's capac-
ity to change the regulation and enforcement of international trade.
In a survey of Court of Justice case law, both policy and doctrinal
reasons exist as to why the General Agreement has no direct effect:
(1) the General Agreement has a pragmatic nature and scheme; (2)
the General Agreement does not have as much effect in the Commu-
nity legal order as compared to agreements preparing European na-
tions for Community membership; and (3) GATIT's dispute resolution
procedure is ineffective and not binding on the contracting parties.
The Court of Justice in International Fruit Co. NV v. Produktschap
voor Groenten en Fruit determined the direct effect of the General
Agreement by examining: (1) the nature of the General Agreement;
159. Id. at [ 109-10.
160. EC Treaty art. 173.
161. Ulrich Everling proposed that consensus would be necessary in EC external
relations because the member states are still fighting for influence in this area.
Everling, supra note 70, at 105. This observation was made before the Maastricht
Treaty and Germany v. Council, and hence the strength of this statement is
questionable.
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(2) the general scheme of the Agreement; and (3) GATT's dispute
resolution procedure. 162
a. The Nature of the General Agreement
In determining the nature of the General Agreement and whether it
has direct effect, the Court looked to the spirit of the General Agree-
ment and noted that the General Agreement was written with a flexi-
bility in its provisions. The Court of Justice explained that the
"flexibility" of the provisions is illustrated in articles XIX, XXII and
XXIII of the General Agreement.163 Article XIX of GATT is entitled
"Emergency Action on Imports of Particular Products." The provi-
sion gives a contracting party the right to suspend an obligation in
whole or in part when "serious injury" is likely to result to the domes-
tic producers of the contracting party facing this harm.' 64 Before any
contracting party can take action, it must give notice in writing to the
CONTRACTING PARTIES and allow sufficient time for consulta-
tion.' 65 The contracting party in question may nevertheless suspend
its obligation pursuant to the provisions of article XIX(3). 66 Thus,
while article XIX provides for "self-help" by a contracting party, it
nonetheless imposes certain requirements before a contracting party
can take advantage of the remedy. 67
Some commentators agree with the Court of Justice and recognize
the General Agreement as a set of guidelines for international trade
policy, not as a set of clear unconditional obligations on contracting
parties. 68 Provisions of the General Agreement are described as
"norms of aspiration" not "norms of obligation, ' 169 and the ECJ
seems to agree. The Court of Justice characterizes the General
Agreement as a flexible document because of its text and the manner
in which the document is applied. While a flexible document may be
effective in trade negotiations, it lacks the strict definition and obliga-
tion of an agreement with direct effect in the Community legal order.
162. See Joined Cases 21 to 24/72, International Fruit Co. v. Produktschap voor
Groenten en Fruit, 1972 E.C.R. 1219, 1226-28, 2 C.M.L.R. 1, 20-22 (1975).
163. Application of GATT, supra note 10, at 429. For an analysis of articles XXII
and XXIII of GATI regarding dispute resolution see infra notes 223-57 and accompa-
nying text.
164. GATr, supra note 6, art. XIX(1)(a).
165. Id. art. XIX(2)
166. Id. art. XIX(3) (giving contracting parties the power to suspend obligations
unilaterally).
167. Articles XXII and XXIII deal with the dispute resolution procedure and will
be treated more thoroughly later. See infra notes 218-49 and accompanying text.
Interestingly, articles XIX and XXII have been used as model language in free-
trade agreements between the Community and other nations and later held to have
direct effect. See Application of GATT, supra note 10, at 431.
168. Paul J. G. Kapteyn, The "Domestic" Law Effect of Rules of International Law
Within the European Community System of Law and the Question of the Self-Execut-
ing Character of GATT Rules, 8 Int'l Law. 74, 81 (1974).
169. Id.
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b. The Scheme of the General Agreement
The Court of Justice also examined the General Agreement's gen-
eral scheme in its determination of the Agreement's direct effect. The
Court explained that the General Agreement is conciliatory in nature
and its terms are not subject to legal interpretation. The analysis
seemed to focus on the Agreement's enforcement and application
rather than the language of the Agreement itself.17 In International
Fruit, the Court noted:
[Tihe principle of negotiations undertaken on the basis of 'recipro-
cal and mutually advantageous arrangements' is characterized by
the great flexibility of its provisions, in particular those conferring
the possibility of derogation, the measures to be taken when con-
fronted with exceptional difficulties and the settlement of conflicts
between the contracting parties.1 7
1
In Schliter v. Hauptzollamt Ldrrach,1' the Court of Justice focused
on the entire scheme of the General Agreement, examining not only
the language of the provisions of the Agreement but also the overall
structure and purpose of the Agreement in determining direct ef-
fect.7 3 In Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Societd Pe-
trolifera Italiane SpA, the Court of Justice again referred to the
"general scheme of GATT" and emphasized the importance of the
flexibility of the provisions, and the possibility of derogation. 7 4
c. Other International Agreements
To understand better what the ECJ means by the "general scheme"
and why the General Agreement fails to provide individuals and
member states particular rights, it is helpful to examine the Court's
judgments regarding the direct effects of other international agree-
ments within the Community legal order. In a case regarding the
170. The Court of Justice stated:
In deciding whether the applicant can rely on certain provisions of GAIT to
challenge the lawfulness of the Regulation, it should be noted that the Court
has held that the provisions of GATI have the effect of binding the Commu-
nity. However, it has also held that in assessing the scope of GATT in the
Community legal system, the spirit, the general scheme and the terms of
GATT must be considered.
Case C-280/93, Germany v. Council at 1 105 (Oct. 5, 1994) (LEXIS, Eurcom library,
CASES file).
171. Joined Cases 21 to 24/72, International Fruit Co. v. Produktschap voor
Groenten en Fruit, 1972 E.C.R. 1219, 1227, 2 C.M.L.R. 1, 22 (1975).
172. Case 9/73, 1973 E.C.R. 1135, [1974 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8233 (1974).
173. Id. at 1157, [1974 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8233, at 9143-
15.
174. Joined Cases 267 to 269/81, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Soci-
etA Petrolifera Italiane SpA, 1983 E.C.R. 801, 830, 1 C.M.L.R. 354, 379 (1984); accord
Case C-280/93, Germany v. Council at 106 (Oct. 5, 1994) (LEXIS, Eurcom library,
CASES file).
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Community's free trade agreement with Portugal, the Court of Justice
first noted that the EC Treaty gives the Community institutions the
power to adopt legislation in the Community. The institutions also
possess the power to form agreements with non-member state coun-
tries and international organizations. 75 Under article 228(2), these
types of agreements are binding on the Community institutions as well
as the member states.'76 Therefore, "it is incumbent upon the Com-
munity institutions, as well as upon the Member States, to ensure
compliance with the obligations arising from such agreements. '177
C.A. Kupferberg & Cie. illustrates the distinction between the EEC-
Portugal agreement and the General Agreement that the Portugal
agreement was a deep agreement and created obligations that ex-
tended into diverse areas, 78 thereby requiring uniform application of
the law. The EEC-Portugal agreement was of a very intimate nature
designed to prepare Portugal for eventual EC membership. 79 The
Agreement provided for harmonization of legislation, and the Court
reasoned that the requirement of uniform application of Community
law necessarily created an unconditional obligation sufficient to have
direct effects in the Community legal order. 8" Unlike the EEC-Por-
tugal Agreement, the General Agreement regulates international
trade and is not designed to integrate the whole world into one free
trading bloc. By its very purpose and effect, the EEC-Portugal Agree-
ment differs from the General Agreement.' 8'
175. Case 104/81, Hauptzollamt Mainz v. C.A. Kupferberg & Cie., 1982 E.C.R.
3641, 3662, 1 C.M.L.R. 1, 20 (1983). EEC Treaty art. 228 (as in effect in 1987)
provides:
1. Where this Treaty provides for the conclusion of agreements between
the Community and one or more States or an international organization,
such agreements shall be negotiated by the Commission. Subject to the
powers vested in the Commission in this field, such agreements shall be con-
cluded by the Council, after consulting the European Parliament where re-
quired by this Treaty....
2. Agreements concluded under these conditions shall be binding on the
institutions of the Community and on Member States.
Id.
176. 1982 E.C.R. at 3662, 1 C.M.L.R. at 20.
177. Id.; see EC Treaty art. 182.
178. See 1982 E.C.R. at 3665, 1 C.M.L.R. at 22.
179. In Polydor, the Court of Justice noted that the purpose of the EEC-Portugal
Agreement was to pave the way for Portugal to enter the Community by eventually
eliminating all trade barriers between the Community and Portugal. Case 270/80,
Polydor Ltd. v. Harlequin Record Shops Ltd., 1982 E.C.R. 329, 347, 1 C.M.L.R. 677,
692 (1982); supra note 65.
The most striking difference between the General Agreement and the EEC-Portu-
gal Agreement was that the EEC-Portugal free trade agreement contained an uncon-
ditional rule against discrimination and eliminated trade barriers between the
Community and Portugal. Case 104/81, Hauptzollamt Mainz v. C.A. Kupferberg &
Cie., 1982 E.C.R. 3641, 3660, 1 C.M.L.R. 1, 18 (1983).
180. See 1982 E.C.R. at 3662, 1 C.M.L.R. at 20.
181. See Impact of the Case Law, supra note 116, at 1436 ("The Court always inter-
prets international agreements on their own terms; it never attempts to interpret such
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The Court will always consider the context in which an agreement
was reached in determining whether the stipulation is "unconditional
and sufficiently precise to have direct effect."'" The interpretation of
international agreements requires an analysis of the agreements' pur-
poses. The Court in the EEA Opinion supported this proposition by
citing article 31 of the Vienna Convention of May 23, 1969 on the Law
of Treaties. 183 The Court held that article 31 of the Convention man-
dates a good faith interpretation of an international agreement by
considering the text of the agreement, in its ordinary meaning, in con-
junction with its context in the agreement and in light of the agree-
ment's objective.' 84
d. GATT's Dispute Resolution Procedure
A third important area examined by the Court of Justice in deter-mining whether the General Agreement has direct effect is GAT's
dispute resolution procedure. As the Court of Justice recognized, arti-
cle XXIH of the General Agreement governs most disputes involving
contracting parties.8 5 Article XXIII of the General Agreement is an
often cited example of the General Agreement's flexibility and loose-
ness.'86 The Court also emphasized the "self help" aspect of the Gen-
eral Agreement by stating how contracting parties may unilaterally
impose sanctions.'" An agreement providing for unilateral actions
generally cannot impose clear and precise obligations on the Commu-
nity and thus lacks direct effect in the Community legal order. Such
factors weigh against the General Agreement having direct effect.
e. Other Reasons for Denying the General Agreement Direct Effect
Several other reasons unmentioned in the judgments support the
Court's finding that the General Agreement does not have direct ef-
fect. First, while the Court has a duty to maintain objectivity and en-
sure that the law is applied, it also must enforce the purpose of the
Treaty. As one of the institutions of the Community, the Court is re-
sponsible for the Community's interest and welfare. As an example of
this concern, one commentator noted, "[w]hether international legal
obligations of the EEC as considered "clear" and "unconditional"
enough in order to be "directly applicable" by EC citizens and EC
agreements according to the significance of certain terms within the Community
law.").
182. 1982 E.C.R. at 3665, 1 C.M.L.R. at 22.
183. Opinion 1/91, Re the Draft Treaty on a European Economic Area, 1991 E.C.R.
1-6079, 1-6101, 1 C.M.L.R. 245,268 (1992); Vienna Convention, supra note 21, art. 31.
184. 1991 E.C.R. at 1-6101, 1 C.M.L.R. at 268.
185. Joined cases 21 to 2472, International Fruit Co. v. Produktschap voor
Groenten en Fruit, 1972 E.C.R. 1219, 1228, 2 C.M.L.R. 1, 22 (1975).
186. Case 9/73, Schltiter v. Hauptzollamt lrrach, 1973 E.C.R. 1135, 1157, [1974
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt Rep. (CCH) 1 8233, at 9143-15.
187. 1972 E.C.R. at 1228, 2 C.M.L.R. at 22-23.
1995] 1317
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
courts depends to some extent also on the "value" which one attrib-
utes to the obligation.' 88 The above statement is a criticism of the
Court's granting of direct effect to an agreement such as the one be-
tween the European Community and Portugal, while denying that ef-
fect to the General Agreement. The Court of Justice, however, has
never been shy about weighing Community welfare against objectivity
in determining direct effect. This "purpose" aspect is quite apparent
in the banana dispute. The European Community has a strong inter-
est in the performance of the Lom6 Convention and in the ACP na-
tions' continued receipt of aid to promote future development. If the
Court granted the General Agreement direct effect, the Community
tariff regime probably would have been struck down. By denying the
General Agreement direct effect, the Court preserved the Commu-
nity's interest in helping developing areas.
Another reason weighing against General Agreement direct effect
in the Community is that even if the Court recognized the Agree-
ment's direct effect, the conclusion may not be the same in another
contracting party's internal legal order, such as the United States. 8 9
While the Court stated that this fear of non-reciprocity is not enough
to warrant the denial of direct effect,'9 it certainly is a relevant
consideration.
Under the general rule of international law, however, the bona fide
performance of every agreement is required.191 As the Court of Jus-
tice stated, the existence of an institutional structure for the resolution
of disputes does not suggest that the Court should deny the General
Agreement direct effect."9 Thus, other factors must come into play in
the Court's denial of General Agreement direct effect.
First, the ECJ is troubled, not by the fact that GATT has a dispute
resolution procedure, but because the procedure does not seem to re-
solve conflicts and instead only stimulates discussion. A prime exam-
ple is the banana trade dispute and the Framework Agreement
negotiated months after the issuance of the unadopted Panel Report
and adopted by most of the Latin contracting parties.19 3 The Frame-
work Agreement was a political resolution reached at the conclusion
188. The EEC as a GATT Member, supra note 17, at 59.
189. See Mississippi Poultry Assoc. v. Madigan, 992 F.2d 1359, 1365-66 (5th Cir.
1993); Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1219, 1222 (C.D.
Cal. 1973).
190. Case 104/81, Hauptzolamt Mainz. v. C.A. Kupferberg & Cie., 1982 E.C.R.
3641, 3663-64, 1 C.M.L.R. 1, 21 (1983).
191. 1982 E.C.R. at 3663-64, 1 C.M.L.R. at 21.
192. Case 70/87, F~d~ration de l'industrie de l'huilerie de la CEE (FEDIOL) v.
Commission, 1989 E.C.R. 1781, 1831, 2 C.M.L.R. 489, 525 (1991).
193. Corrigendum to the European Communities' schedule of concessions for agri-
cultural products as regards bananas, Schedule LXXX (on file with the Fordham Law
Review).
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of the Uruguay Round negotiations as opposed to a legal resolution
resulting under the GATT dispute resolution procedure. 19'
f. Avoiding Multiple "GATT Forums" and the Opinions on the
EEA
The Court also is concerned about the creation of multiple fora to
resolve GATT disputes. It is important "to avoid a situation in which
the rights and obligations of the GATr member countries could be
differently interpreted and applied in different bodies.""a
Professor Miquel Montafia i Mora responded to the concern of mul-
tiple GATT forums by pointing to the Court of Justice's Opinion 1/
91196 regarding the European Economic Area.197 In his interpretation
of the ECJ's decision, Professor Montafia i Mora explained, "when an
international treaty to which the EC is a party, sets up a court to settle
the disputes and, consequently, to interpret the treaty, the decisions of
such court bind community institutions, including the Court of Jus-
tice.198 Professor Montafia i Mora noted that such decisions also bind
the Court of Justice in its interpretation of the treaty in preliminary
rulings or annulment actions, so long as the agreement is a part of the
Community legal order.'19 Professor Montafia i Mora continued that
under the Court's reasoning, the ECJ would be bound by VTO dis-
pute settlement proceedings, meaning panel reports and Appellate
Body rulings.2° Professor Montafia i Mora believed that his conclu-
sions were accurate regardless of the General Agreement's direct ef-
fect in Community law because the General Agreement is generally
accepted as "an integral part of the Community legal order.' "'
Professor Montafia i Mora's argument demonstrates the need for
caution in extrapolating dicta from Opinion 1/91 when interpreting
the General Agreement's direct effect in the Community. First, the
EEA is a far more comprehensive agreement than is the General
Agreement. The EEA agreement provides for the free movement of
goods, persons, services and capital, sets up a system of monitoring
competition or anti-trust activities and fosters cooperation in fields
such as research and development, the environment, education and
194. Id. at 4 ("This agreement represents a settlement of the dispute between Co-
lombia, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Nicaragua and the Community on the Community's
banana regime. The parties to this agreement will not pursue the adoption of the
GATT panel report on this issue.").
195. Long, supra note 14, at 27.
196. EC Treaty art. 228 authorizes the Court of Justice to give an Opinion, as op-
posed to a Judgment, on the legality of an agreement entered into by the Community
pursuant to that article. See EC Treaty art. 228(1).
197. See Montafia i Mora, supra note 17, at 175-76.
198. Id. at 175.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 176.
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social policy.2° 2 Second, the WTO Agreement does not create a judi-
cial system exactly like the European Economic Area because the
membership of the WTO is worldwide and does not involve a regional
free trade area.20 3 Third, Professor Montafia i Mora correctly points
out that the ECJ explained that an international agreement between
the Community and other nations may provide for its own judicial
system empowered to settle disputes between the Community and a
non-member state.2" Decisions from such courts would be binding
on the Court of Justice.2 5 But the Court limited this statement by
noting that that such an international agreement may not interfere
with the internal legal order of the Community, including the Commu-
nity's secondary legislation.2° Professor Montafia i Mora failed to
mention this proviso, although it is a major reason why the Court of
Justice struck down the first draft of the Agreement establishing the
EEA.207
The Court of Justice noted many other problems with the draft
EEA Agreement. The proposed EEA Agreement would have af-
fected the secondary legislation of the Community and non-member
states in the EEA.2 °s In addition, the EEA Court would not have
been bound by Court of Justice decisions after the signature of the
EEA Agreement.20 9 While the proposed EEA Agreement provided
that non-EC member states who were parties to the EEA Agreement
could authorize their courts to refer questions to the ECJ, it failed to
guarantee that resulting ECJ decisions would having binding effect.210
The Court found this particular provision to be especially unaccept-
able.21' As the Court of Justice summarized, "Article 238 of the EEC
Treaty does not provide any basis for setting up a system of courts
which conflicts with article 164 of the EEC Treaty." '212
202. See Agreement Establishing the European Economic Area art. 1(2), reprinted
in 1994 O.J. (L 1) 1.
203. See Opinion 1/91, Re the Draft Treaty on a European Economic Area, 1991
E.C.R. 1-6084, 1-6101-02, 1 C.M.L.R. 245, 268-69 (1992).
204. Montafia i Mora, supra note 17, at 175.
205. Id. Those decisions will bind the Court of Justice if it is called upon to rule, by
way of preliminary ruling or in a direct action, on the interpretation of the interna-
tional agreement, "in so far as that agreement is an integral part of the Community
legal order." 1991 E.C.R. at 1-6106, 1 C.M.L.R. at 271; Montafia i Mora, supra note
17, at 175.
206. The Court considers the Community's secondary legislation to be the funda-
mental provisions of the Community legal system. 1991 E.C.R. at 1-6106, 1 C.M.L.R.
at 271.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1-6107, 1 C.M.L.R. at 272.
210. Id. at 1-6109, 1 C.M.L.R. at 273.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1-6111, 1 C.M.L.R. at 275. The EEC Treaty provides:
The Community may conclude with a third State, a union of States or an
international organization agreements establishing an association involving
reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedures....
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Furthermore, the Court of Justice certainly would not find itself
bound by the WTO dispute settlement bodies, despite Professor Mon-
tafia i Mora's claims.2 3 WTO panels and the Appellate Body are not
bound by Court of Justice case law. No provision in the WTO Agree-
ment provides that the WTO is bound by the Court's case law. More-
over, no provision states that a panel or the Appellate Body must
refer a question regarding Community law to the Court of Justice.
A second ECJ opinion regarding the EEA addressed the above is-
sues.214 The Court of Justice accepted a revised text of the EEA
Agreement based on the following reasons: (1) the proposed EEA
Court would not be created;21 (2) national courts of non-EC EEA
members that refer questions to the Court of Justice would be bound
by the Court's answers;216 and (3) the Court of Justice would not be
required to "pay due account to decisions of other courts."2 7 Thus,
where the Community enters into an international agreement that af-
fects the Community's internal legal order, but also creates a system
of courts not bound by ECJ decisions and case law, the agreeement is
in violation of article 164 of the EC Treaty.
IV. GATT DisPuTE RESOLUTION THROUGH ARTICLES XXII AND
XXI 218
The Court of Justice has an accurate perception of the GATT dis-
pute resolution system, especially its lax provisions and pragmatic ap-
proach. The most effective way to illustrate how GATT differs from
the WTO is to examine the workings of both models of world trade in
the context of the current banana trade dispute. An examination of
Where such agreements call for amendments to this Treaty, these amend-
ments shall first be adopted in accordance with the procedure laid down in
Article 236.
EEC Treaty art. 238 (as in effect in 1991).
Although the Court of Justice states that an amendment of the EC Treaty would be
required for the EEA Agreement to be compatible with the Treaty, the Court also is
hinting that some aspects of the Treaty, namely article 164 and its provision that the
Court of Justice shall ensure that the law is observed, may not be amendable. 1991
E.C.R. at 1-6111, 1 C.M.L.R. at 275. This sounds like the German constitutional the-
ory that certain fundamental Constitutional principles may not be amended. The Hon.
Joseph M. McLaughlin, The Unification of Germany: What Would Jhering Say?, 17
Fordham Int'l LJ. 277, 284 (1994).
213. Montafia i Mora, supra note 17, at 176.
214. Opinion 1/92, 1992 OJ. (C 136) 1, 12,2 C.M.L.R. 217 (1992) (holding that the
reworded draft agreement establishing the EEA passes muster).
215. Id. at 8, 2 C.M.L.R. at 237.
216. Id. at 10, 2 C.M.L.R. at 238-40.
217. Id. at 10, 2 C.M.L.R. at 238.
218. The dispute resolution process that is discussed in this Note refers to articles
XXII and XXIII of the General Agreement and does not include the special dispute
resolution processes like the one provided for in the Multilateral Trade Negotiations
Subsidies Code Agreement. Enforcing International Trade Law, supra note 91, at 55.
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the effectiveness of the dispute resolution procedures of both models
is necessary.
The dispute resolution procedure under the General Agreement is
outlined in four main legal texts: GAIT articles XXII and XXIII,
supplemented by the "Understanding regarding notification, consulta-
tion, dispute settlement and surveillance" and by the "Decision of the
CONTRACTING PARTIES dated November 10, 1958 in regards to
article XXII procedures."2 19 Although consensus decision making is
no longer required at every step of the procedure,220 the ability of a
defending contracting party to delay the dispute resolution procedure
is still insurmountable.
A. Informality and Pragmatism of GATT Dispute Resolution
The General Agreement's dispute resolution procedures, in accord-
ance with the Court's opinion, are so informal and loosely constructed
that they cannot possibly satisfy the Van Gend en Loos's "clear and
unconditional" test. 21 A laxity pervades the whole procedure, which
results from the practice of the CONTRACTING PARTIES. 2 One
of the best examples of this laxity is the legal status of the European
Community under the General Agreement. While it is true that the
"wait-and-see" approach adopted by the CONTRACTING PARTIES
was a success for the Community, the approach created a precedent
that the CONTRACTING PARTIES should have avoided. This prag-
matic approach soon threatened to appear in areas outside the EC
GATT-legality issue, including agriculture and international develop-
ment agreements.223 Arguably, the principle of pragmatism basically
"governed the interpretation and administration of the General
Agreement by the GATT Secretariat and by some of the most influen-
tial contracting parties." 4 Examples of this pragmatic behavior in-
clude the status of the European Community as a customs union and
219. Long, supra note 14, at 72.
220. See DSU, supra note 33, art. 6.
221. Case C-280/93, Germany v. Council at 110 (Oct. 5, 1994) (LEXIS, Eurcom
library, CASES file) (stating that the test is whether GATT contains unconditional,
clear and precise obligations so as to be directly applicable in the Community); see
also Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse administratie der belastingen,
1963 E.C.R. 1, 13, C.M.L.R. 105, 130 (1963) (stating that the test is whether the Treaty
contained a clear and unconditional prohibition "not qualified by any reservation on
the part of states which would make its implementation conditional upon a positive
legislative measure enacted under national law. The very nature of this prohibition
makes it ideally adapted to produce direct effects . . ").
222. The General Agreement has weaker sources of regulatory authority than what
the ITO would have provided because GATT was intended to be provisional. Legal
System, supra note 11, at 58.
223. Id. at 212.
224. Kel6 Onyejekwe, GATT, Agriculture, and Developing Countries, 17 Hamline
L. Rev. 77, 122 (1993).
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all of the trade agreements concluded between the Community and
other nations.
An important reason exists for the pragmatic approach of the
GATT dispute resolution procedure. The CONTRACTING PAR-
TIES are lax in enforcing the General Agreement because GATT
started off with a cohesive membership. The dispute resolution pro-
cess was not necessarily legalistic and could afford to be informal; the
early legal disputes were easily resolved.'3 Regardless of whether
pragmatism is a principle contained in the General Agreement, 2 6
however, commentators believe that a system regulating global trade
could have survived only by adopting such a pragmatic and political
approach to the resolution of disputes as opposed to a strict legalistic
approach.227
B. The Actual Process
The process begins when a legal claim is referred to a panel of
either three or five independent people selected by the GATI Secre-
tariat with the consent of the parties.' s The most frequent problems
in the dispute resolution process involve delays by the defending con-
tracting party, including hindering of the panel's creation.22 9 Once
created, however, the panel receives oral and written legal arguments
from the parties, as well as intervenors.23 The panel, after hearing
the arguments, deliberates with the assistance of the GAIT Secreta-
riat and produces a report that should contain a well-reasoned legal
opinion settling the dispute.231 The panel report has no legal force
unless the CONTRACTING PARTIES adopt it.232 If a panel decision
is not adopted, it is as if the report was never written. Thus, many
contracting parties refuse to accept panel rulings, thereby denying the
panel decisions legal effect.233 Under certain circumstances, the Com-
225. Enforcing International Trade Law, supra note 91, at 29.
226. Long, supra note 14, at 61.
227. 1& at 62. Besides the pragmatism, the most damaging aspect of the GAIT
dispute resolution process is the consensus requirement of contracting parties. "Deci-
sion-making in the various GATT organs is characterized by the practice of consensus
(notwithstanding the general rule of voting by majority provided for in art. XXV)
.... " The EEC as a GA7T Member, supra note 17, at 37. During the early years of
GATI7, consensus was required at every stage of the resolution procedure, thereby
giving the defending contracting party the ability to block the creation of a panel to
adjudicate on the dispute as well as giving the losing contracting party the ability to
prevent the adoption of the report. Enforcing International Trade Law, supra note 91,
at 9.
228. Enforcing International Trade Law, supra note 91, at 9.
229. Id. at 54.
230. Id. at 9.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. See id at 54.
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munity, like other contracting parties, blocks adverse panel
decisions.3 4
Even if a panel decision was adopted, the legal effect of the ruling
was tenuous for two reasons. First, panel reports were originally
drafted in ambiguous language for political reasons.3 5 As a result,
the body of legal rulings interpreting the General Agreement did not
truly develop until the mid 1980s.36 Second, panels originally had no
right to review government actions, 37 thereby severely limiting their
abilities.
Occasionally a panel issues a report on the merits of the case even
when the dispute is moot. Panels do so because the same issue or
similar questions later may arise in a different context.238 These deci-
sions seem to be an effort by panels to create a body of "law" to be
used for reference in the future3 9 Moreover, the flexible rules of the
General Agreement can be difficult to interpret and apply.
The GAT dispute resolution procedure functions more as a cata-
lyst to facilitate dialogue and to enable debating contracting parties to
reach a mutually agreeable resolution rather than to force one con-
tracting party to admit its guilt.24 Perhaps the GATT never envi-
sioned a dispute resolution process that could quickly adjudicate each
contracting party's legal obligations and faults. Rather, the GATT
may see its prime objective as ensuring that violations of the General
Agreement are only temporary and resolved as quickly as possible.241
The "Understanding regarding notification, consultation, dispute set-
tlement and surveillance" codified the customary practice of GAIT
dispute resolution and singles out four essential elements of dispute
resolution, two of which are, "recourse to bilateral and multilateral
consultations in order, as a first priority, to reach an amicable settle-
ment; [and] settlement of disputes, not as a result of a quasi-judicial
decision, but through recommendations conducive to re-establishment
of a balance of concessions and advantage between the parties to the
dispute.242
The only remedy available to a contracting party is retaliation, but,
"neither punitive action nor direct coercion by the Contracting Parties
234. Id. at 201.
235. Id. at 12.
236. Id. at 258.
237. Id. at 259.
238. Id. at 262.
239. Id. at 262. Nonetheless, the issue of stare decisis from previous panel decisions
remains ambiguous. Id. at 263.
240. An example of this would be the association agreements entered into by the
Community and the issue of the GATT-compatibility of those agreements that were
never resolved. The United States agreed to cease challenging the Community's vari-
ous article XXIV agreements, the association pacts, in exchange for Community con-
cessions on the Generalized System of Preferences. Id. at 39.
241. Long, supra note 14, at 71.
242. Id. at 72-73 (emphasis ommitted).
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[sic] is provided for in the General Agreement against a member
country in breach of its obligations. ' 243 Feuding contracting parties
cannot be forced to come to a settlement, nor can the panel quickly
make a determination of who is right or wrong. In addition, the party
at fault cannot be punished for its violation of its obligations under the
General Agreement. ' According to this text, therefore, the only
force available to a contracting party to remedy its violations of the
General Agreement, other than the complaining contracting party's
unilateral trade retaliations, is "moral pressure" on the defending con-
tracting party to adhere to its duties under the Agreement.24 5
In the banana trade dispute, a panel issued a report specifically ad-
dressing the EC banana tariff regime's GATT-compatibility. 2? " The
panel decided that the regime violated the General Agreement, 4 7 but
the Community blocked the adoption of the report by the Council.
Thus, most of the Latin banana exporters entered into the Framework
Agreement.24s Guatemala, the only Latin GATT contracting party
that did not agree to the settlement offered by the Community, in-
tends to pursue dispute resolution in the World Trade Organization.24 9
V. WTO DisPUTE RSOLUTrION
One of the goals of the Uruguay Round discussions was to address
the common dissatisfaction with the dispute resolution procedures of
GA=T.11 The negotiating group responsible for revising the dispute
resolution procedure was given the following charge:
In order to ensure prompt and effective resolution of disputes to the
benefit of all contracting parties, negotiations shall aim to improve
and strengthen the rules and the procedures of the dispute settle-
ment process, while recognizing the contribution that would be
made by more effective and enforceable GATr rules and disci-
plines. Negotiations shall include the development of adequate ar-
243. Id. at 66.
244. Id. at 76.
245. Id at 85.
246. Panel Report, supra note 67, at 52.
247. Id. The Panel Report found the Community's tariff regime to be inconsistent
with a number of General Agreement articles: (1) the duties levied on banana imports
are inconsistent with article I; (2) the tariff preference accorded to ACP bananas
over Latin bananas are inconsistent with article I and cannot be justified by article
XXIV or article XX(h); and (3) the system of allocating import licenses is inconsistent
with articles I and III and could not be justified by article XXIV nor by article XX(h).
Id.
248. See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
249. Deborah Hargreaves, Brussels in a Banana Split, Fin. Times, Oct. 31, 1994, at
16; Belgium: Guatemala Vows to Keep Fighting EU Banana Regime, Reuter New-
swire, Oct. 6, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS File.
250. James R. Holbein & Gary Carpentier, Trade Agreements and Dispute Settle-
ment Mechanisms in the Western Hemisphere, 25 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L 531, 536
(1993).
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rangements for overseeing and monitoring of the procedures that
would facilitate compliance with adopted recommendations.25
1
The WTO stands up to this charge by clearly defining the dispute res-
olution procedure. 2
A. Basis for a WTO Dispute Resolution
WTO dispute resolution makes some important changes in interna-
tional trade relations. The "settlement of disputes between Members
concerning their rights and obligations under the provisions" of the
WTO Agreement is under the DSU35 3 As a general matter, the de-
fault rule for the WTO is that the Organization is "guided by the
decisions, procedures and customary practices followed by the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947 and the bodies established in
the framework of GATI 1947."12 The rule provides for continuity in
decision making, the continued creation of panels and encouragement
of dispute resolution through negotiation.25
B. The Actual Process"6
It is understood that at all times during the dispute resolution, until
a panel report is issued, the WTO members continue negotiations.
25 7
If a member requests consultation pursuant to an agreement covered
under the DSU, the defending member must: (1) reply within ten
days after receiving the request; and (2) enter into good faith negotia-
tions within thirty days after receiving the request."5 If the defending
member fails to fulfill either of the two requirements, the complaining
member may directly request the establishment of a panel." 9 If there
is no settlement within sixty days following receipt of the request by
the defending party, the panel is established.26 Third-party members
who have a significant interest in the dispute, such as the United
251. Jackson, supra note 10, at 3-4.
252. The United States was always one of the more vocal contracting parties seek-
ing to strengthen the dispute resolution process, although in practice its record of
accepting various panel reports is spotty. Id. at 49. While the European Community
"has been one of the most ardent opponents of improvement in the GATT dispute
settlement process during the last 15 years," id., the issue of sovereignty did not play
as big of a role in the ratification process in the various EC member states as it did in
the United States. Some commentators suggest that Congress does not realize how
much power it has given to the WTO, mainly because of the WTO's stringent dispute
resolution procedure. David E. Sanger, After Years of Talk, Trade Pact Now Awaits
Congressional Fate, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1994 at 1, 34.
253. DSU, supra note 33, art. 1(1).
254. WTO Agreement, supra note 17, art. XVI(1).
255. DSU, supra note 33, art. 11.
256. For the purposes of this discussion, assume that a WTO Member, such as
Guatemala, raises a complaint against the regime.
257. See DSU, supra note 33, art. 3(6).
258. Id. art. 4(3).
259. Id. art. 4(3).
260. Id. art. 4(7).
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States, will also be involved in consultations. 261 A panel is then estab-
lished according to the DSU, unless the Dispute Settlement Board262
"decides by consensus not to establish a panel. ' 263
Once the panel is established, arguments from all sides are re-
viewed, including third parties. The United States, for example,
would intervene" and express its views when the panel convenes.
261. Id art. 4(11). The DSU also provides for cases of urgency, but they will not be
discussed here. See id. art. 4(8).
262. The Dispute Settlement Board ("DSB") administers the rules and procedures
laid out in the Understanding. Id. art. 2(1). It has authority "to establish panels,
adopt panel and Appellate Body reports, maintain surveillance of implementation of
rulings and recommendations and authorize suspension of concessions and other obli-
gations under the covered agreements." Id. art. 2(1). Significantly, all Board decisions
shall be done by consensus. Id. art. 2(4). Whether this consensus requirement will
impair the dispute resolution process is unclear. Perhaps the DSB can maintain the
strictest independence from the members and judge objectively each request for a
panel.
263. Id. art. 6(1). The Panels will have complete independence from the members.
For the elaborate provisions regarding the selection of panel members, see article 8 of
the DSU.
264. Id. art. 10(2). This is because of the section 301 weapon, a provision of the
United States Trade Act that requires the President to impose unilateral sanctions
where a vital United States trade interest is at stake. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988).
Section 301 provides for private parties to submit petitions to the United States Trade
Representative's office to seek relief. See 19 U.S.C § 2412(a) (1988). After a period
of investigation, if the Trade Representative determines that rights of the United
States under any trade agreement are being violated or that any act, policy, or prac-
tice of a foreign country "denies benefits" to the United States, 19 U.S.C.
§ 2411(a)(2)(A) (1988), then the Trade Representative may suspend or withdraw obli-
gations, impose duties, or enter into binding agreements to ensure elimination of the
act or policy. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c) (1988). Section 301 was enacted so that the United
States administration would take strong action against foreign trade barriers through
GATI when the General Agreement was insufficient for stronger acts. Enforcing In-
ternational Trade Law, supra note 91, at 43. One commentator has suggested that
certain GATrC legal complaints would not have been filed by the United States if it
were not for section 301. Id. at 44, 47. Section 301 has been a very successful tool for
the United States in fighting foreign trade barriers. Id. at 51. This Note does not
address the issue of Super 301 that deals with intellectual property.
Article 23 of the DSU seems directed at section 301 and would not permit unilat-
eral action by a WTO member outside the WTO forum. Article 23 provides in part:
1. When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other
nullification or impairment of benefit under the covered agreements or an
impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements,
they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this
Understanding.
2. In such cases, Members shall:
(a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred
... except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with
the rules and procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any
such determination consistent with the findings contained in the
panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration
award rendered under this Understanding.
DSU, supra note 33, art. 23.
An interesting topic would be whether article 23 of the DSU would have direct
effect in the Community.
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The Understanding instructs the panel to objectively assess the debate
before it, draw conclusions of fact as well as conclusions of law, and
make any other findings that will assist the DSB in making the proper
recommendation or appropriate ruling.265 If one or more of the par-
ties involved in the dispute resolution is a developing country mem-
ber, the panel must indicate in its panel report how it took account of
that fact in arriving at its conclusion.266
The Panel first issues to the parties involved an interim report that
includes the descriptive sections of its draft report.267 The Panel then
meets with each party to discuss issues on the interim report.268 If the
panel does not receive any comments, the interim report becomes fi-
nal and will be circulated to all the members.269 By placing the bur-
den of proof on the defending member,270 the DSU makes it more
attractive for the defending member to come to some sort of resolu-
tion before the panel report is issued.
The European Community has a similar measure, Council Regulation 2641/84 on
the Strengthening of the Common Commercial Policy with Regard in Particular to
Protection Against Illicit Commercial Practices, 1984 O.J. (L 252) 1, modified by
Council Regulation 522/94, 1994 O.J. (L 66) 10. Regulation 2641/84 permits "[ajny
natural or legal person, or any association not having legal personality, acting on be-
half of a Community industry which considers that it has suffered injury as a result of
illicit commercial practices" to lodge a complaint. Council Regulation 2641/84, 1984
O.J. (L 252) 1, art. 3. If the Commission determines, after a lengthy procedure, that
action is necessary to protect the Community's interests, the Community must first
seek to address the issue through any dispute settlement procedure and if that fails
then seek to suspend or withdraw any concessions that are compatible with the ex-
isting international obligations. See Council Regulation 2641/84, 1984 O.J. (L 252) 1,
arts. 10, 11, 12.
These two pieces of legislation fall under the international law doctrine of "diplo-
matic protection," where individuals who wish to complain against another nation
must raise this complaint within their domestic legal system. See Jackson, supra note
10, at 69. The principle behind this theory is that a nation may weigh whether other
interests outweigh the private individual's complaint against the particular country.
Id. at 70. The issue of standing for private individuals will continue as business execu-
tives have already started calling for private access to the WTO dispute settlement
procedure. See Australia: ABB Chief Wants Complaints Procedures at WTO, Reuter
Textline, Bangkok Post, Dec. 8, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS
File. David de Pury, co-chair of ABB Asean Brown Bovery, raised his concern that
"[iln an era where a growing number of companies represent not only national, but
global interests as well, it no longer makes sense to limit direct access to GATT/WTO
procedures only to national governments." Id. For the present time there seem to be
no plans to provide private access.
Regulation 2641/84 may be amended once again as the Commission proposes to
add a third method by which private individuals may file a complaint. The proposed
amendment permits affected Community exporters outside the Community to ask the
Commission to take up their case at the WTO.
265. DSU, supra note 33, art. 11.
266. Id. art. 12(11).
267. Id. art. 15(2).
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. art. 3(8).
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The DSU states that the aim of the dispute resolution is not to de-
termine guilt, but "to secure a positive solution to a dispute.""VI If no
resolution results, "the first objective of the dispute settlement mecha-
nism is usually to secure the withdrawal of the measures concerned if
these are found to be inconsistent with the provisions of any of the
covered agreements." 72 In this respect the WTO dispute resolution
process resembles the GATT 1947 process, because the aim is to end
quickly any potential violations and to seek an equitable solution
rather than to determine who is right or wrong.273
The Understanding states that the DSB's actions must aim at reach-
ing a mutually satisfying solution according to the pertinent agree-
ment. 4  While the Understanding contains provisions regarding
compensation, they are to be strictly controlled in application. S As-
sume, however, that a Panel report is issued, holding that the Commu-
nity's tariff regime is incompatible with many articles of the General
Agreement.2 7 6 If the parties in conflict at this time still have not
reached a solution, the panel submits its written report to the DSB for
discussion.' Parties objecting to a panel report must give a written
explanation and circulate it at least ten days before the discussion of
the panel report.278 The DSB cannot deliberate to adopt a panel deci-
sion until at least twenty days after the report has been circulated to
all the members. 9 But adoption of the panel's conclusions must be
made within sixty days of the circulation of the panel report to all the
members unless a party notifies the DSB of its intention to appeal, in
which case the report will not be adopted pending the appeal3m
The most significant change to the current trade dispute resolution
process is the WTO's creation of the Appellate Body, a unique and
unprecedented institution in international trade."8 The Appellate
Body "has all the characteristics of an international tribunal [and] rep-
resents the most radical innovation introduced in GAIT dispute set-
tlement since the generalization of the panel procedure in 1952."M A
standing Appellate Body is established by the DSB when a party ap-
271. Id art. 3(7).
272. Id.
273. Montafia i Mora, supra note 17, at 129.
274. DSU, supra note 33, art. 3(4).
275. Id. art. 3(7). A member may also be fined, see id., but it remains to be seen
how this provision will have effect in application.
276. This assumption is not meant to reflect any conclusions on the banana tariff
regime. Panel Report, supra note 67, at 52.
277. DSU, supra note 33, art. 12(7).
278. Id art. 16(2).
279. Id. art. 16(1).
280. Id art. 16(4).
281. Jeffrey M. Lang, Full Committee Hearing on the World Trade Organization,
Federal News Service, June 10, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS
File.
282. Montafia i Mora, supra note 17, at 144.
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peals a panel case. With respect to the banana trade dispute, either
Guatemala or the European Community could appeal the findings,283
but the United States, as a third party, could not.284 A party may
appeal only issues of law and the panel's legal interpretations; findings
of fact are not subject to Appellate body review.2 5
This creation of the Appellate Body is seen as a dramatic shift to-
ward legalism. 286 An Appellate Body report is adopted by the DSB
and accepted in its entirety by the parties involved in the dispute, un-
less the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report within
thirty days following its circulation to the members.2 7 If the Appel-
late Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a covered
agreement, "it shall recommend that the Member concerned bring the
measure into conformity with that agreement."'  But, "the Appel-
late Body cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations pro-
vided in the covered agreements." 9
C. The WTO's Stricter Rules on Dispute Resolution
The WTO is the only forum to resolve trade disputes and enforce
the General Agreement upon all WTO members, including the
United States and the European Community.29° Through its rules on
unilateral action, binding effect, time limits and general clarification of
member duties and obligations, the WTO functions as the only forum
for resolving trade disputes such as the banana conflict.
A WTO member's unilateral trade retaliation is strictly controlled.
Article 22 of the Understanding provides that the DSB must authorize
the suspension by one member of concessions or other obligations
under the covered agreements.29' The Understanding also provides a
long list of factors to consider in deciding what concessions or other
obligations to suspend. First, the complaining member should seek to
suspend concessions within the same sector "as that in which the panel
or Appellate Body has found a violation or other nullification or im-
283. DSU, supra note 33, art. 17(1).
284. Id. art. 17(4).
285. See id art. 17(6).
286. Montafia i Mora, supra note 17, at 151.
287. Interestingly, the requirement of consensus here actually serves as a catalyst
for the parties to reach a solution, whether through the WTO or through negotiations.
DSU, supra note 33, art. 17(14).
288. Id. art. 19(1).
289. Id. art. 19(2).
290. The WTO is the only forum for resolving trade disputes between contracting
parties. While Jan Tumlir stated that GATT should be adopted by contracting parties
into domestic legislation because of the lack of an "external power-balance compel-
ling ... observance," the VTO is this external power-balance. Jan Tumlir, GATT
Rules and Community Law, in The European Community and GATT 1, 21 (Meinhard
Hilf et al. eds., 1986).
291. DSU, supra note 33, art. 22(2).
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pairment.' '292 If the first option is not available, the complaining party
should seek to suspend concessions and other obligations in other sec-
tors under the same agreement. 93 Thus, for example, because the ba-
nana dispute arose under the General Agreement, Guatemala would
seek to suspend concessions in an area covered by the General Agree-
ment, such as another agricultural product. As a last resort, the com-
plaining party should seek to suspend concessions and other
obligations under another agreement.294
The DSB grants authorization to suspend a concession or other ob-
ligations unless a consensus decides to the contrary.295 If the defend-
ing member protests the level of suspension proposed or claims that
the procedure laid out in article 22(3) was not followed, the matter is
referred to arbitration by the original panel, if possible, or by an arbi-
trator appointed by the Director-General. 96 The concessions and
other obligations are not to be suspended pending the outcome of the
arbitration.29 Rather, the arbitration decision is final.29 Suspension
of concessions and other obligations only lasts until the DSB's surveil-
lance mechanism finds that the violating measure is removed.299
One aspect of the WTO dispute procedure that is dramatically dif-
ferent from the GATT 1947 procedure is the strict time limit on each
step of the process." The European Community cannot use its heavy
economic clout as a weapon to force the Latin American countries to
negotiate a resolution before the panel report, because WTO mem-
bers no longer have the ability to prolong and postpone the dispute
resolution process. Instead, the EC must negotiate with the Latin
American countries, because the panel may find against the EC, and
they will be compelled to take action. If the EC refuses to change the
banana regime and does not wish to pay compensation, the Commu-
nity's only other option would be to withdraw from the VTO.30'
If the defending member, here the European Community, agrees to
take steps to conform with the General Agreement, the VTO process
292. Id art. 22(3)(a).
293. Id. art. 22(3)(b).
294. Id art. 22(3)(c). Article 22(3)(d) also lists some other factors to consider
before retaliation. Id art. 22(3)(d).
295. Id. art. 22(6).
296. Id
297. Id.
298. Id art. 22(7).
299. Id. art. 22(8).
300. Id. art. 3(3) (stating that "[t]he prompt settlement of situations... is essential
to the effective functioning of the WTO"). See also id. art. 12(5) ("Panels should set
precise deadlines for written submissions by the parties and the parties should respect
those deadlines."); id art. 12(9) ("In no case should the period from the establishment
of the panel to the circulation of the report to the Members exceed nine months.").
301. Article XV(1) of the VTO Agreement provides that "Any Member may with-
draw from this Agreement." VTO Agreement, supra note 17, art. XV(1). Such a
withdrawal applies to both the WTO Agreement as well as the Multilateral Trade
Agreements. Id
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is not yet completed. Article 21 of the Understanding provides for
WTO surveillance of compliance with DSB recommendations or rul-
ings.30 1 The Understanding provides that the DSB keep the defending
member's implementation of adopted recommendations or rulings
under surveillance. 30 3
Many other strong arguments exist for using the WTO as the single
forum for trade disputes in addition to its cohesive and integrated dis-
pute resolution process. Use of the WTO procedures, among other
things, avoids having multiple fora interpreting the General Agree-
ment and other trade agreements. For example, what would happen if
the General Agreement had direct effect in the Community, and yet
the Court of Justice's interpretation conflicted with the panel's
conclusion? 3 4
D. Limitations
As with any organization, the WTO also has its limitations. Only
countries that sign on to the Uruguay Round may utilize the WTO;
countries such as Russia, China and Taiwan, which are three of the
largest economies outside of the GATT System, are not yet subject to
WTO rules. Moreover, in this banana dispute, countries like Ecua-
dor, which are not GATT contracting parties but who suffer the ef-
fects of the banana tariff, have no recourse.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE ISSUES
The WTO is the only body to adequately enforce the General
Agreement and give the Agreement legal effect throughout the world.
The CONTRACTING PARTIES, who are now becoming WTO mem-
bers, recognize the incredible potential of this new international trade
regulation body. The WTO members must not apply the WTO
Agreement in such a loose way so as to make its rules ineffective.
WTO members such as the European Community, the United
States and Japan may find the strict guidelines of the WTO confining,
because they no longer can politically finesse their GATT violations
by blocking the adoption of panel reports. But these members simply
must adapt to this new and better standard of international trade reg-
302. DSU, supra note 33, art. 21.
303. Id. art. 21(6).
304. The Banana Panel Report concluded that the regime violated article I of the
General Agreement, the Most-Favoured-Nation Clause, and that the violation could
not be justified under article XXIV because the Lom6 Convention did not create a
free trade area. Panel Report, supra note 67, at 52. The Court of Justice could have
accepted the General Agreement's direct effect and held that while the tariff regime
was inconsistent with article I of the Agreement, the Lom6 Convention was a free
trade area and therefore deviation from the General Agreement was justified. Such a
scenario would cause a crisis because the duties and obligations of the European
Community to the General Agreement would conflict with the Community's internal
legal order.
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ulation; otherwise, the world will revert back to the ineffective GATT
system.3 o5
Some future issues still lurk regarding the banana trade dispute and
the WTO. While these issues are beyond the scope of this Note, they
are worthy of attention because it is likely that they will surface in the
public debate over the next few years.
First, the European Community is currently growing with the addi-
tion of Austria, Finland and Sweden on January 1, 1995. All three
countries are big Latin banana consumers. 3° Therefore, the Latin ba-
nanas supporters may have enough votes within the Council of Minis-
ters to change the banana tariff regime. Even if they do not have the
qualified majority vote, however, the banana dispute will continue be-
cause Lom6 V will be up for discussion in the near future, and the six
European Community member states that prefer Latin bananas surely
will introduce the issue.
Second, many unsettled issues remain regarding the implementa-
tion of the WTO. For example, one of the most crucial questions is
what happens if a "GATT 1947" contracting party who does not ratify
the WTO Agreement has a dispute with a WTO member. Does the
WTO dispute process apply or does the "GATT 1947" procedure ap-
ply? If a conflict arises, there is pressure for the "GAIT 1947" party
to ratify the WTO Agreement so that it can benefit from the stricter
rules. But what if a WTO member has a complaint against a "GATT
1947" contracting party? In that situation no incentive exists for the
"GATT 1947" party to ratify the WTO Agreement, because it would
then be subject to stricter rules.30 7 With respect to ACP nations, what
if only a portion of the ACP GATT contracting parties ratify the
WTO Agreement? Will that portion need to apply for a waiver under
the WTO?
305. As one commentator noted, "It]here may, in other words, be something to the
belief, long held by the 'old GATr hands,' that it is better to have a flexible, imperfect
system that protects the major principles than a system so disciplined that it provokes
violation and defiance." Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Remedies Along with Rights: Institu-
tional Reform in the New GATT, 88 Am. J. Int'l L. 477, 481 (1994).
306. Debra Percival, Trade: Germany Vows to Continue Attacks on EU Banana
Regime, Inter Press Service, Oct. 5, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library,
ALLNWS File. Sweden is a most important market for American banana firms be-
cause Sweden has the highest per capita consumption of bananas in the world, at 17.5
kg. per capita. Petition, supra note 75, at 30.
Austria's accession to the European Community generally means lower prices for
the Austrian consumer, for example: pasta (25% lower), dairy products (20% lower
for butter), cattle feed (20% lower). EU Austria Names its Candidates for EU Legal
Institutions, Reuter Textline, Agence Europe, Jan. 4, 1995, available in LEXIS, World
Library, ALLNWS File. On the other hand, banana prices may go up by as much as
50%. Id
307. For discussion of GATI' procedures see supra notes 223-57 and accompanying
text. For discussion of WTO procedures see supra notes 250-304 and accompanying
text.
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Third, the issue of standing for private individuals must be ad-
dressed by the WTO. American firms such as the Chiquita Banana
Company and private individuals can currently seek relief through
section 301 actions. Section 301 actions, however, might be prohibited
under the WTO.308 While public international law does not allow for
private standing, the WTO should nonetheless consider permitting
private individuals access to its dispute resolution procedure. °9
308. Creating the WTO as the single forum for the regulation of world trade may
eliminate different national measures, such as the section 301 action. See supra note
264. The United States Trade Representative, Mickey Kantor, initiated investigations
on the trade practices of the European Community, Colombia and Costa Rica pursu-
ant to 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(2). See Commission to Discuss Banana Trade Probe with
U.S., The Reuter European Community Report, Oct. 18, 1994, available in LEXIS,
World Library, ALLNWS File. Chiquita first submitted a petition to the United
States Trade Representative pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a).
The procedure for petitions under 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a) is as follows. After the
Trade Representative decides to initiate an investigation pursuant to 19 U.S.C.
§ 2412(a)(2) (1988), he must then consult with the foreign country concerned, or in
this case the European Community, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 2413(a) (1988). Under 19
U.S.C. § 2411(b)(1) (1988), the Trade Representative must then determine whether
"the rights to which the United States is entitled under any trade agreement are being
denied." If the Trade Representative determines there has been a § 2414 violation,
under § 2411(b)(1) he is authorized to take appropriate action. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b)(1)
(1988). The Trade Representative is required to monitor foreign compliance, 19
U.S.C. § 2416 (1988) and modify or terminate the adopted actions when the burden
on the United States has decreased or ceased. 19 U.S.C. § 2417 (1988).
The petition for the section 301 investigation was filed by Chiquita Brands Interna-
tional. According to the Chiquita Petition, the Framework Agreement reached be-
tween the Latin American countries and the European Community will allow the
Latin American nations to impose "onerous export licensing fees" on the United
States banana marketing companies while privileged European firms will be exempt.
Petition, supra note 75, at 22. The petition quotes the EC Farm Commissioner, Ren6
Steichen, as saying that the Framework Agreement's arrangement of export licenses
was "necessary in order to enable Latin America to protect themselves against Amer-
ican multinationals." Id. (emphasis omitted). Chiquita claims that the Framework
Agreement aims to improve the market share of the European banana marketing
interests at the detriment of the American firms. Id. Chiquita claims in its petition
that
the most egregious and injurious feature of the new organization for U.S.
banana companies has been the import license allocation scheme applicable
to all bananas entering under the third country quota. The new licensing
rules have resulted in the material expropriation of established business
from U.S. banana marketing companies and the arbitrary transfer of that
business to a select group of privileged EU firms, who have in no way con-
tributed to the development of the business they have been given.
Id. at 35. The petition goes on to claim that the past American entitlement of export-
ing roughly 600,000 tons of bananas is now in European hands. Id. at 36. Under the
Framework Agreement, United States companies in Latin America must obtain ex-
port certificates for the Community while privileged European firms need not do so.
Id. at 53.
309. From 1987 to 1988 there was a surge in the number of United States com-
plaints filed with GA'IT, because during this time the administration was seeking
Congressional authority for the Uruguay Round. During times when Congress is in-
volved in trade matters the administration is always pressured to take an active role in
eliminating foreign trade barriers through section 301 actions. Enforcing International
GOING BANANAS
Clearly, the number of legal and political issues regarding the ba-
nana dispute is endless. Nonetheless, the WTO is the only vehicle to
resolve this trade debate. More importantly, the WTO members, in
the application of the Dispute Settlement Understanding and the
WTO Agreement, must enforce the spirit of these documents. The
WTO must ensure that members involved in a dispute adhere to the
strict time schedule. If the dispute resolution process is exhausted, the
WTO must ensure compliance and perhaps the payment of a mone-
tary amount. Some will find this approach rigid, difficult to manage
and unworkable. But, the possibility of an adverse panel decision that
is final and binding encourages the amicable resolution of disputes
outside the formal process. In conclusion, the WTO is an excellent
forum for nations to assert their legal rights in trade disputes and to
seek a just resolution to their problems.
Trade Law, supra note 91, at 209. Removing such barriers will deprive private parties
of standing. While this is not a novel idea under international law, it nonetheless
raises significant questions because of the pervasiveness of the Uruguay Round ac-
cords dealing with financial services and intellectual property. All of these issues are
significant for multinational corporations and for practicing attorneys. It is very im-
portant to seek some sort of recourse for clients who have been wronged.
The frustrations that multinational corporations will soon face is voiced by Chiquita
in its section 301 Petition:
In a real sense, Petitioners have no recourse left other than Section 301 to
protect their vital interests. For the past few years, extraordinary resources
have been dedicated to GAFT challenges, to ECJ challenges, and to com-
pany representations throughout the world. The U.S. Government has made
numerous informal representations as well. Through it all, no relief has been
achieved, and, with the signing of the Framework Agreement, the banana
policy has become more unreasonable, discriminatory and burdensome by
many orders of magnitude. Unless Section 301 is activated to block the
Framework Agreement and reform [EC] Regulation 404[/93], irreparable
harm to Petitioners' interests is inevitable.
Petition, supra note 75, at 90.
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